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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to examine and articulate in philosophical terms the
inherent differences in the poetics of William Wordsworth and Robert Frost. This work
differs from many other critical works that have considered the two poets’ similarities
and differences in that it considers these concepts from a philosophical standpoint. The
study looks at the specific philosophical backgrounds of the two poets and utilizes
vocabulary and concepts from these to describe the poets’ different poetical movements
in describing similar subjects.
John Locke’s concepts of modes and substance ideas are used to describe the
other things that appear in the lines of Wordsworth and Frost. The study also uses the
concept of David Hartley’s associationism and the concept of transcendence to articulate
the different poetic movements the two poets make. William James’s pragmatism is also
used to draw a connection from Lockean logic into Frost’s own philosophy.
These concepts help answer the question of what do these poets find important.
The concepts also help describe how and why Wordsworth finds meaning beyond earth
while Frost finds meaning on it.
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INTRODUCTION
This study focuses on two relatively popular and recognizable poets, who reveal
their poetical ideas by using relatively popular and recognizable natural things. The
rocks and trees, birds and clouds, neighbors and farmers and mothers and wives seem to
be what attract so many people to the poetry of William Wordsworth and Robert Frost,
just as these things and persons attracted the poets themselves. In “Lines Composed a
Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey,” Wordsworth writes “I again repose…and view/ These
plots of cottage-ground, these orchard-tufts…” (9-11). The British poet affirms that
when he is in “lonely rooms, and ‘mid the din/ Of towns and cities,” it is these
“beauteous forms” that bring him “sensations sweet,” and those sensations ultimately
help him pass “into [a] purer mind” (25,22, 27, 29). Frost captures similarly beautiful
natural images in his poetry. In “Directive,” readers see the beauty of nature as he
attempts to retreat from the chaos of the world, as Wordsworth does, into the beauty of
nature: “Back out of all this now too much for us,/ Back in a time made simple by the
loss/ Of detail…There is a house…upon a farm” (1-2, 3, 5, 6).
Many critics, as well, have been attracted to the two poets and have compared
their (arguably) similar styles. Wordsworth and Frost use common natural ingredients
but in different ways to make their works beautiful and approachable. The two poets start
in the common, (rather) generic nature, but in their poetry they take different paths,
investing their own ideas into these things and natural settings and leaving their readers
with new and different appreciation for natural things and settings. In their lines, both
poets express an overall appreciation of nature, in their pictures of it and their questions
about it, in their sentimental tug towards it and their transcendent departure from it.
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Though both poets launch their ideas from the common ground of natural scenes and
pictures of rural people, animals, and objects in their lines, ultimately the two poets reach
different conclusions about the “nature” of these natural things and the work of poetry.
They seem to disagree on what is really important, what is essential for meaning, and
where and how that meaning is to be found when dealing with natural things.
I am intrigued by how these two poets of nature can deal with such similar
physical things and ultimately arrive at such different philosophical conclusions. Though
their subjects are similar, they do not treat these subjects in a similar fashion. The two
poets have markedly different agendas, it seems, even though they choose similar natural
scenes with which to begin their poems. Nature and natural things support both poets.
For Wordsworth the natural scene and things are a launching pad, from which he soars
into associations and toward transcendent realities. For Frost the natural scene is
sufficient and is where he stays; his ideas bloom from it, are rooted in it, are (ultimately)
impossible without it. And though Wordsworth does not stay on the physical scene
because the transcendent reality is his goal, both poets do share this common starting
point. Nature holds up both poets, and they hold it in their poetry. Frost holds it with
reverence and with suitable boundaries, so he can appreciate its physical existence from a
philosophical distance. Wordsworth holds nature and natural things in his gaze, from his
physical distance so these objects will stimulate his ideas—begin the associative
process—and in order philosophically to penetrate them and ultimately transcend all of
the physical reality.
The philosophical background for both poets is an appropriate starting point for
such a study, and in the first chapter, I begin with John Locke and his ideas concerning
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physical things and modes to help distinguish the “things” that Wordsworth and Frost are
both picturing in their lines. David Hartley and his ideas about associationism aid this
study as well. Since it is obvious that Wordsworth and Frost do not differ in their
subjects—just in how they treat these subjects—the concepts of transcendence and
association of ideas are useful in labeling the philosophical movements of the two poets
around, above, into their subjects.
Most critical works that draw comparisons between Wordsworth and Frost are
actually studies of Frost, in which critics analyze and assess the influence of the romantic
poet on the modern poet. Reuben A. Brower provides many important details of the
influence aspect in the Wordsworth-Frost pairing. Brower notes, “Wordsworth and
Emerson—and above all Wordsworth—were poets who had shaped the characteristic
figure of poems about the natural world” (39). Brower’s objective is one of showing
“how [Frost’s] special poetic revelation relies on and diverges from the poetic revelation
of Wordsworth and Emerson” (42). He does so by looking at the ways in which Frost
was influenced by Wordsworth and Emerson and then how Frost poetically reacted to his
romantic predecessors.
Lawrence Thompson, in a few of his works on Frost, deals with the direct
influence of Wordsworth on the modern poet. In Fire and Ice, Thompson notes that
Wordsworth’s “ ‘Prefaces’ had considerable influence on [Frost;]…they had taught him
(as he later confessed) not only to keep his eye on the object but also to keep his ear
against himself” (98). In Robert Frost: The Early Years 1874-1915, Thompson notes that
Frost’s mother quoted Wordsworth to her children in order to convey “the ability to feel
in nature a presence which could and should inspire with the joy of elevated thoughts”
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(71). In Frost’s Road Taken, Robert F. Fleissner, in turn, notes how Frost reacted as a
result of Wordsworth’s influence. Fleissner says, “Untermeyer [a close friend of
Frost]…has suggested that at times Frost tended even to try to out-Wordsworth
Wordsworth: ‘His devotion to the intimacies of earth is, even more than Wordsworth’s,
rich, almost inordinate in its fidelity…’” (103). Other works that mention Wordsworth’s
direct influence on Frost are William H. Pritchard’s Frost: A Literary Life Reconsidered
and Donald J. Greiner’s Robert Frost: The Poet and His Critics. Richard Poirier, as well,
in Robert Frost: The Work of Knowing mentions Frost’s reactions to a Wordsworthian
nature: “In his conception of sound…[Frost’s] speaker wants us to recognize that he is
not the passive, sometimes fearfully receptive listener of Wordsworth…” (286).
These studies are helpful for any scholar preparing to look deeply at Frost’s
poetry, and they do, to varying degrees, provide background for Wordsworth’s influence
on the modern poet. My argument, however, is ultimately not about direct influence of
the romantic poet on the modern one. This study is less biographically and more
philosophically based. In explaining Frost’s philosophical purposes in his poetry, most of
these critics do deal with William James as one of the poet’s philosophical forebears.
They do not, however, because these are studies concentrating on Frost, include
Wordsworth’s philosophical background or use philosophers like Locke and Hartley to
articulate the differences in the poetics of Wordsworth and Frost. This is exactly what I
wish to do, since this is a study of both poets. I use Locke’s modes and ideas of
substances along with Hartley’s associationism to distinguish between the philosophical
objectives and outcomes of the poems of Wordsworth and Frost.
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Many critics begin a Wordsworth-Frost comparison with Frost’s own words about
Wordsworth. Greiner sees Frost’s “A Tribute to Wordsworth” delivered at Cornell
University in 1950 as an appropriate starting point for any comparison of the two poets
(142). In this informal talk, Frost compliments the romantic poet and talks about two
facets of him: the essential Wordsworth, which has a “banality which penetrates ‘right
down into the soul of man’” and the “intellectual” Wordsworth. Frost also mentions
specific poems that influenced him, such as “Ode to Duty” (143). As Greiner notes from
Frost’s comments, “[Frost] apparently senses an affinity between his own poetry and
Wordsworth’s lyrics” (143). Two other critics in their articles in The Cambridge
Companion to Robert Frost mention remarks the modern poet made about Wordsworth.
Blanford Parker quotes Frost complimenting Wordsworth’s “insipid tone, sweet, insipid
tone” (180). Timothy Steele notes that Frost said “Wordsworth was right in trying to
reproduce in his poetry not only the words—and in their limited range, too, actually used
in common speech—but their sound” (144).
These comments give a starting point. One can learn what it is that Frost liked
about Wordsworth and perhaps why some of his poems read like those of the romantic
poet. However, I consider less personal motives—how Frost might have wanted to
distinguish himself from or affiliate himself with Wordsworth—and more the
epistemology behind the poetics of both poets. In this vein, Locke’s empiricism is
helpful, since it was a basis for Wordsworth’s philosophy and also since it compares to
and contrasts with Jamesian pragmatism, which greatly influenced Frost. I use these
philosophical divergences and the evidences of them that appear in the poets’ lines to
draw distinctions between the two poets.
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Many critics locate the point of departure between Wordsworth and Frost in
Frost’s skepticism, as it comes across in his poetry in a mocking, witty, ironic or sarcastic
tone. Such observations about Frost’s skepticism are helpful for founding my argument;
they give me a linguistic platform from which I can then dive into a philosophical
argument. W. W. Robson in his article “The Achievement of Robert Frost” draws a
comparison between “Death of the Hired Man” and “Michael”: he says that the
“significant difference between the poems” is a “difference in spiritual value,” and that
this is found in the use of the pastoral quality. Wordsworth, Robson says, “uses
pastoral—normally a mode of irony for Frost—with complete seriousness” (213).1
Though the implications of this point are arguable, Wordsworth does refrain from a
mocking tone that Frost utilizes. Brower also notes Frost’s mocking tone as a way of
distinguishing himself from his literary predecessors: “Frost draws strength from the
Wordsworthian-Tennysonian tradition while gently mocking it” (83). Brower, looking at
Frost in contrast to another of his literary influences, sees in Frost’s “Directive” “a kind
of humor alien to both Eliot and Wordsworth” (235). Jonathan N. Barron and Richard
Poirier also mention Frost’s skepticism as a point of divergence from his romantic
predecessor(s). In his fascinating article “Robert Frost and a New Tradition” Barron says
that “Frost writes in a Romantic idiom developed by Wordsworth, while, on the other
hand, he manifests a twentieth-century skepticism” (16). Poirier contrasts “Spring Pools”

1

Brower attributes Frost’s rejection of the pastoral to his rejection of “the urban
sophistication of pastoral, which lies behind the pathetic fallacy [as noted in “The
Importance of Being Versed in Country Things”,]…and he is certainly not one to indulge
in the sophistication of the idealist…” (80).
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with a Wordsworthian sentiment; he comments, “A difference between Frost and
Wordsworth should be apparent[;]…the poem is feisty rather than brooding” (17).
I, too, give examples illustrating Frost’s skepticism, and the details of my
argument (in reference to both poets) refer to how this skepticism affects the way Frost
treats nature and the natural things he pictures in his lines. Likewise, I discuss
Wordsworth’s complete faith in nature. This deep trust which the romantic poet holds
causes him to settle into nature, to plunge into it. Such philosophical movements contrast
sharply with the strict boundaries and borders Frost erects in his lines to keep the things
that are separate separate.
Considering Frost’s skepticism and Wordsworth’s faith helps explain their
respective views of the natural world around them. In this work, I discuss Frost’s darker
view of nature in contrast to Wordsworth’s sublime and beautiful one. Brower, too,
contrasts the comfort that is to be found in Wordsworth’s prayer at the Grand Chartreuse
with the lack of comfort and reassurance at the end of Frost’s “Acquainted with the
Night” (127-128). While comparing Thoreau and Frost in “Robert Frost and the
Darkness of Nature,” Roberts W. French makes a brief statement of contrast between
Wordsworth and Frost: “In a similar mood [to Thoreau], the young Wordsworth went to
nature for consolation and spiritual renewal, but Frost never does that; nature offers no
such blessings for him” (156). Arguments like these establish a foundation onto which I
build further arguments. I consider the notion of Wordsworth being Christian—an
argument augmented by William Ulmer’s “The Christian Wordsworth”—since he could
be said to have faith whereas Frost has skepticism. Also, I consider where Frost’s
skepticism takes him—certainly not into despair but into a more man-made (in contrast to
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natural) “salvation.” These “religious” (or philosophic) matters lead into my discussion
of transcendence as well.
The critical arguments that approach my own more closely are the ones that note,
philosophically speaking, how Wordsworth and Frost differ in their view of
nature/natural things around them. However, I have yet to find one study that deals with
the same philosophical background and trajectory that I do in explaining the two poets’
philosophical differences. Griener and John F. Lynen—in The Pastoral Art of Robert
Frost—discuss, in their comparisons of Wordsworth and Frost, the two poets’ views
about the (dis)ability of the poet to reconcile (wo)man with nature. Griener finds “The
key difference between Frost’s approach to nature and Wordsworth’s…[is] that
Wordsworth stresses the union of mind and external reality by suggesting the merger of
thought and the natural scene…. Nowhere [in Frost’s poetry] do we discover
Wordsworth’s faith in the kinship between man and nature, but we do find everywhere in
Frost’s poetry the gulf separating the two” (145-146). Lynen states that Wordsworth sees
a “union of mind and external reality” (142); “thought and object merge” in his lines
(143). Lynen illustrates, using “The Wood Pile,” how Frost, on the other hand, “views
nature as essentially alien” (145).
In this work, I consider these differences between the two poets and their
implications, working to articulate these differences by using the philosophical heritage
of associationism. I use not only David Hartley’s associationism but also the tradition of
this concept, as David Rapaport deals with it in The History of the Association of Ideas. I
also use works like J. H. Van den Berg’s “The Subject and His Landscape” and Linda
Brigham’s “Beautiful Conceptions and Tourist Kitsch: Wordsworth’s ‘Written with a
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Slate Pencil…’” to uncover the philosophical outcome of the liberties Wordsworth takes
with nature—his infusing things with his spirit, as Jaques Blondel says. And I use Judith
Oster’s Toward Robert Frost: The Reader and the Poet to reveal the outcome of Frost’s
strongly held boundaries.
Also, in this aspect of the comparison between Wordsworth and Frost, I include
feminist critique with the help of Karen Kilcup’s informative Robert Frost and the
Feminine Literary Tradition. In picturing the “other things” in their lines, the two poets
differ as well in their dealings with women. Wordsworth, just as he does with other
natural things, takes great liberties with the female personas in his lines, making them
appear more like one-dimensional objective correlatives to his thoughts rather than like
real people. Kilcup mentions Wordsworth in passing a few times but does not offer in
any depth a contrast between the two poets. I apply to Wordsworth the categories that
she uses to classify Frost as feminine (in some aspects of his work—because he is less
transcendent and presents “more real” female characters). By using some of Kilcup’s
categories, I have been able to employ gender terms to uncover further and compare the
poetic practices of association of ideas and transcendence in these two poets.
In addition to his presenting real characters, many critics note that Frost exhibits
greater grace and ease in describing and creating other people in his poetry than does
Wordsworth. In “Robert Frost: The Edge of the Clearing,” James M. Cox argues that “It
is Frost’s ability to be a farmer poet which distinguishes him most sharply from
Wordsworth, with whom he’s often compared. Wordsworth played the part of the poet
concerned with common man, but Frost has persistently cast himself in the role of the
common man concerned with poetry” (145). Robson deals with this contrasting point
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well: Frost’s voices are “the poet’s own and that of someone very different from
himself…[and they] seem equally ‘natural’” in contrast to Wordsworth’s different voices,
Robson notes, since Wordsworth’s other voices in his lines are affected and seem
“unnatural” (208-209). Frank Lentricchia also mentions this in “The Resentments of
Robert Frost.” In Frost, he says, “there is no separation…of poetic and laboring voices”
(242). Lentricchia goes on to note that Wordsworth, on the other hand, is “a third-person
observer,” and in “The Solitary Reaper,” for example, his “physical distance from the
reaper is an aid to the distance required for imaginative reflection” (242).
While I use arguments like those of Cox, Robson, and Lentricchia in my own
analysis and classification of the differences between the poetics of Wordsworth and
Frost, I develop more strictly my own philosophical structure to classify the differing
postures of the two poets. As I explain in the next chapter, Wordsworth’s stance is one of
physical solitude—as Lentricchia notes, he calls the reaper “yon” highland lass (242).
Wordsworth keeps the physical space between himself and his subjects, but he
philosophically plunges himself into these other things. Frost, on the contrary, gets
closer, physically speaking, to his subjects. For instance, in “A Time to Talk,” he does
not stay away (at a physical distance) and yell to his neighbor; instead he goes over to
talk to the friend. Frost does, however, remain always philosophically separate from his
subjects.
To introduce the philosophical notions of transcendence and association of ideas
that I use in this work to distinguish between the practices of Wordsworth and Frost, a
closer look at an example from their poems seems appropriate. A comparison between
“Intimation of Immortality” and “The Birthplace” offers an example of the contrasting
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views of nature that the two poets express. In “Intimations of Immortality,” Wordsworth
laments his loss of inspiration and that there “hath past away a glory from the earth” (18).
However, in this ode, which seems initially like one only of loss, there is ultimate
redemption, and Wordsworth’s redemption is natural—based in nature:
O joy! That in our embers
Is something that doth live.
That nature yet remembers
What was so fugitive! (133-136)
The redemption from the loss is achieved because nature remembers and in remembering
saves the poet from being lost. There is a union between nature and the poet; it
recognizes him and remembers him. It holds him, insuring his importance and cosmic
value.
In “The Birthplace,” the scene, though stated in a very different way, is a similar
one. Frost’s shorter poem, too, is a meditation upon origins. But in Frost’s poem the
“home” is constructed by man: “Here further up the mountain slope/ Than there was ever
any hope,/ My father built” (1-3). Similar to how Wordsworth’s ode begins, there is little
“hope” initially in Frost’s scene. However, there come in “The Birthplace” hints of
nature’s pleasure upon beholding her inhabitants: “The mountain seemed to like the stir,/
And made of us a little while/ With always something in her smile” (8-10). There seems
to be a recognition of man by nature, as in Wordsworth’s poem. Frost’s poem, however,
is quietly and slyly sown full of doubt and skepticism, whereas Wordsworth’s is not.
Wordsworth affirms that “Our Souls have sight of that immortal sea/ Which
brought us hither” (167-168), but Frost’s bringing (or making) is all done by man:
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My father built, enclosed a spring,
Strung chains of wall round everything,
Subdued the growth of earth to grass,
And [even] brought our various lives to pass. (2-5)
There is no great transcendent force, no immortal sea that brought Frost’s characters to
their birthplace or brought them into being. The origins he illustrates are erected by man,
and there is looming doubt that if man had not brought into being these “things”
(children, etc.), nature would have done so. Wordsworth’s origins, on the other hand, are
of some transcendent force. Therefore, it is Wordsworth’s nature—and the transcendent
reality it stands for—that remembers him. Frost’s nature, on the other hand, forgets:
“Today she [the mountain] wouldn’t know our name/…The mountain pushed us off her
knees./ And now her lap is full of trees” (11-14). There is no remembrance in Frost’s
nature (and the subtle, witty tone indicates there never was), no deeper connection
between nature and (wo)man that leads to a transcendent (and comforting) reality which
can make one feel universally important. Frost could, as I show he does in some poems,
figure associated ideas onto this scene—a movement that makes his poems look like
Wordsworth’s. But in “The Birthplace” he does not; he stays on earth, while
Wordsworth in “Intimations” floats into a transcendent reality that comforts and affirms.
That striking difference in their poetry is crucial.
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CHAPTER ONE:
PRESENTING THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE TWO POETS
AND ESTABLISHING THE RHETORIC OF THIS STUDY
In considering the “great, great, great” expanse—rather than expense, as in Frost’s
“On Extravagance”—of things, Wordsworth and Frost differ in how they relate—and
relate to—the worlds around them. Primarily they differ in their epistemological
approach to describing in their poetry other things, natural things—other people, animals,
trees. In order to investigate these differences, it is necessary to look at how and where
the poets find meaning, what the poets read in the things around them and what they read
onto these things. And whether they are tripping over the physical landscape or falling
into a deeper meaning of it, transcendence and association are key concepts in exploring
these differences, concepts the poets inherited from their philosophical predecessors. In
this chapter, then, I will elaborate these differences using Lockean philosophy and
(David) Hartleyan associationist psychology, and, for Frost, I will also consider how
Locke and Hartley affect Jamesian pragmatism.
When considering how Wordsworth and Frost look at the natural things around
them, Locke’s modes help draw distinctions between what exactly the poets see. R. S.
Woolhouse in Locke quotes Locke’s description of the concept of modes: “[These are]
Combinations…not looked upon to be the characteristical Marks of any real Beings that
have a steady existence, but scattered and independent Ideas, put together by the Mind”
(120). Woolhouse further distinguishes modes from “substance-ideas which are ‘Works
of Nature’” (120). Substance-ideas are ideas of things, of substances that exist in nature.
However, modes are not—they are “their own ‘archetypes’” (120). Modes, then, are
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ideas of abstract concepts and do not find their basis in naturally occurring things. They
are “‘voluntary collections [of] scattered and independent Ideas’ which are ‘made by the
mind’” (120).
Modes, according to Locke, are all one can know of things, and Wordsworth
seems to adopt this opinion. Ernest Lee Tuveson, in The Imagination as a Means of
Grace, notes that Locke asserts “that the essences of things are unknowable, that all we
can know assuredly is the ideas within our own circle of consciousness,” that we “know,
not reality, but [our] own impression alone” (25). Woolhouse expands Tuveson’s idea by
affirming that Locke says “modes [are the only things] whose real essences we do know”
(90). And modes, these collections of ideas, are what Wordsworth ultimately relates in
detail in his lines, not the unknowable other (physical) things in nature.
In Wordsworth’s Poetry 1787-1814, Geoffrey Hartman, quoting Hazlitt, mentions
the concept of “fill[ing] up the dreary voids with the Moods of [people’s] own Minds”
(345). Hartman, then, notes that the “Moods of the Mind” is the title of one of
Wordsworth’s sections of poems. It seems that Wordsworth would imagine the “dreary
voids” as the things one does not know or the physical things that, as he would assume,
have a deeper but yet unknown meaning. So he fills this void with the moods of his
mind, i.e. ideas sprung from association. This is exactly what Frost refuses to do. In
“Design” Frost toys with the notion of a benevolent Creator, but he ultimately rejects the
possibility, likely because he sees it as only that, a possibility. Frost many times assumes
an “I could go there” tone, but he always ultimately refuses to do so. This is evidenced in
the poem “All Revelation,” as Richard Poirier says in Robert Frost: The Work of
Knowing: “Frost shows his capacity for a Yeatsian accent, almost as if he wants to show
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how masterfully he can resist it” (20). Frost enjoys flaunting his ability but not too far
and then recoiling into reality, as he sees it.
Wordsworth, however, jumps at the chance to make the things that he observes in
nature into a canvas onto which he draws himself. He is an artist, then, drawing
images—his own impressions of reality—onto a canvas, i.e. that which is not him. He
draws onto nature what he conceives in his mind through associated ideas. Is he selfconsumed and out of touch with reality? Some might say yes. Yet, Wordsworth is
perhaps more philosophically intentional than such a description reveals. Wordsworth is
an adherent, at least to some extent, to Lockean logic. Arthur Beatty, in William
Wordsworth: His Doctrine and Art and their Historical Relations, notes that Wordsworth
“approaches the problem of the mind from the angle of Locke, basing his whole theory
on the assumption that thought originates in experience, and that out of the product of
sensation, or experience, ideas and the more complex forms of mentality are developed”
(108), and Mahmoud K. Kharbutli in “Locke and Wordsworth” and Basil Willey in “On
Wordsworth and the Locke Tradition” also acknowledge Wordsworth’s philosophical
tendencies as very Lockean. Wordsworth relates what he knows in terms of this
philosophy. As Locke says, one can only know modes; therefore, in Wordsworth’s lines
modes are the “things” investigated.
Locke’s modes which are not “the steady Workmanship of Nature [but rather]
Collections made and abstracted by the Mind… for the convenience of Communication”
(Woolhouse 121, quoting Locke) differ from person to person. Locke was aware of the
subjectivity of perspective. Since modes are abstracted and associated by the individual,
they have different characteristics determined by the individual describer. As Woolhouse
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says, “The distinction between an idea and what the idea is of is not sharp in the case of
modes” (91). Frank Lentricchia in Robert Frost: Modern Poetics and the Landscapes of
Self reads a similar concept in Frost’s poetry in terms of phenomenology. He uses the
word “landscape” to describe “both a configuration of objects really there in nature and,
as well, the phenomenological notion that any particular landscape is coherent because
the mind of the artist makes it so” (4). The artistic movements of the poet are subjective
ones.
As noted in Lentricchia’s statement, Frost sticks with what he has experienced,
and this places him in the realm of Lockean empirical knowledge—the belief that one can
relate only what he/she has experienced. It is tempting to think, however, that Frost’s
more detailed descriptions of these other things that appear in his lines indicate that he
thinks those are what he can and does know. Drawing such a conclusion would divorce
Frost from Lockean philosophy because these are substances and cannot be, according to
Locke, essentially known. Yet, Frost’s describing these things does not assert that he
claims essentially to know them. Poirier, in fact, explains how Frost is certain that some
things cannot be known or named, and the critic notes how in “The Most of It” that “to be
told that ‘that was all’ does not…mean that ‘all’ is nothing” (164). So the initially
perceived “anticlimactic sigh” that I mentioned could prove to be not so anticlimactic
after all. Poirier describes the “it” in this poem as “an awe-inspiring and wonderful
representation of what we do not know and cannot name” (164). The inference that there
are “things” that cannot be known is perfectly Lockean, as Tuveson notes.
So both poets adhere—to some extent, but maybe to different extents—to
Lockean logic. However, this seeming similarity of philosophical basis leads to
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explanations of the two poets’ inherent differences. It is tempting to think that
Wordsworth’s philosophical movements in the direction of Hartleyan associationism are
what muddle the common basis of Lockean empiricism he shares with Frost. However,
at times Frost also practices associationism, and this concept in and of itself is not so very
distant from Frost’s own philosophical background, as it is based in William James’
pragmatism. Before diving into this philosophical trajectory—from Hartley to James—, I
will discuss associationism, its history, and how it is important in the comparisons
between these two poets. Then I will extend these issues into Frost’s practices of
Jamesian pragmatism.
A short historical overview of associationism will help distinguish between
Wordsworth’s and Frost’s associations. This will also expose the foundations of
associationism and how it is affected by Locke and later by Hartley. In The History of
the Concept of the Association of Ideas David Rapaport deals with Bacon as a founding
father of associationism. Rapaport says that Bacon believed that “all perceptions, of the
senses as well as of the mind, are according to the measure of the individual and not
according to the measure of the universe”(10). Man measures the universe according to
himself; he associates things of the external world with creations in his own subjective
perspective, and he believes the connections: this is associationism. Bacon says some
men believe the associations “created in [their] own subjective imagination…[are] real
connections in the external world” (10). This adequately describes what Wordsworth
practices in his poetry.
Wordsworth assumes that the associations he experiences with external nature are
real connections. In “Composed Upon the Thames Near Richmond” there is an
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association between the poet and nature when the poet recognizes the reflection of his
own heart in the Thames:
Yet be as now thou art,
That in thy waters may be seen
The image of a poet’s heart,
How bright, how solemn, how serene! (9-12)
The possibility of this reflection of a subjective (and individual) state of being in external
nature is the basis of the poem. In many of his poems, a similar association between the
poet and external nature is initially observed and leads to the ultimate importance: the
effect on the poet. This is the how—by way of his associated ideas—and the when—as
they begin to take over his experience—of Wordsworth’s leaving the natural scene.
In general, this is not the practice of Frost. In “On the Heart’s Beginning to Cloud
the Mind,” the poet refuses to fly from the physical scene into an imagined scene. The
poet observes, “Something I saw or thought I saw/ In the desert at midnight in Utah” (12). Upon seeing the “flickering…light,” he begins seeming: “It seemed to me…” (7, 9),
and he falls into a simile: “It would flutter and fall in half an hour/ Like the last petal off a
flower” (11-12). But here, in contrast to his favorable association in “Birches,” Frost
refuses to digress further into seeming. He identifies his tendency toward fancy: “But my
heart was beginning to cloud my mind” (13), and instead chooses the truth, saying, “I
knew a tale of a better kind./ That far light flickers because of trees” (14-15). There is no
reflection of the poet’s imaginative fancy in the natural setting. In this poem, the (initial)
perceived connection between the natural scene and the poet is dismissed as a clouding
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vision. It could be said, then, that Frost distinguishes between the fact of this scene and
his initial opinion, which was created by emotional association of it.
In further unpacking fact and opinion in terms of associationism, Bacon asserts
the following:
There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The
one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms,
and from them, as principles and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and
discovers the intermediate axioms. This is the way not in use. The other
constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually
and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true
but unattempted way [(6) I, 19] (Rapaport 12).
Bacon’s distinction between the two ways of discovering truth foregrounds the difference
between the deductive and the inductive (respectively) approach to gaining information
and ultimately knowledge, and Bacon very much upholds the latter. His words take us
philosophically directly to Locke. Bacon’s distinctions can be qualified in the same way
Woolhouse quotes Locke distinguishing between “knowledge” and “opinion” (84).
Woolhouse says, “Locke’s distinction between knowledge and opinion is, in effect, the
more recent distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge” (133). Locke calls a
posteriori knowledge—the knowledge Bacon defends because it is based on an inductive
approach—“opinion.” Is Locke undermining the validity of inductive approaches to
query? Not necessarily. Locke’s system of opinion he called “natural philosophy” (89),
and he believes that “opinion” is well worth having and developing. As Woolhouse says,
“[Locke] thinks that observation of and experiment on things in the world in order to
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discover their properties is a worthwhile activity” (88). Ultimately, Locke asserts the
importance of having a “system or body of ‘opinion’” (88). In Lockean terms, then, Frost
operates in opinion—describing other things that he himself cannot truly know—i.e.
substances.
Though the “traditional view of ‘opinion’…has to do with contingencies, with
things which might have been otherwise” (88), this definition does not completely
explain Locke’s concept of “opinion.” As Woolhouse explains, “So while for the
Scholastic tradition ‘opinion’ concerns contingencies, for Locke it concerns what to us
seem like contingencies, but what in reality may be universal certainties” (88). These
things considered universal certainties to everyone but Locke are things that we can
observe and see only from experiment, and Woolhouse says that “relying… on
observation we cannot know [something]” (85). Woolhouse gives the example of gold
dissolving in sulphuric acid and quotes Locke as saying “we can go no farther than
particular Experience informs us” in understanding this phenomenon (84). This is
because we have no personal experience being gold, or being any other material or any
other thing. We cannot know—an effect of the limitation of knowledge—because we
cannot have first-hand experience of what it is like to be anything or anyone else.
Because of this, we can never truly know substances. This is true because we can never
know the real essences of substances (87).
Locke says, “Substances afford Matter of very little general Knowledge and the
bear Contemplation of their abstract Ideas…will carry us but a very little way in the
search of Truth and Certainty” (IV.xii.9, Woolhouse 133). So why philosophically
meditate on the physical realm? According to Locke, there is no chance of true

21

knowledge from such practices, and Wordsworth also suggests in his poetical
maneuverings that this is so. Locke says, however, that one can know the real essences
of things like ethics, and, likewise, in his quest for meaning, this is what Wordsworth
forsakes the physical for. He contemplates his natural setting and dives only into
“things”—ideas behind the physical “things”—that, according to Locke, he can truly and
essentially know. That is, rather than wasting time in the physical setting, which is
composed of unknowable substances, the poet transcends it and muses about
philosophical meanings.
In these moves from the physical into the transcendent, further muddling of the
common Lockean empiricism between Wordsworth and Frost occurs. This is the point
where Wordsworth, while remaining faithful to Locke, as Arthur Beatty in William
Wordsworth: His Doctrine and Art in their Historical Relations affirms, assumes more
solidly the language and practices of Hartleyan associationism. Frost and Wordsworth
differ not in the fact but in the degree of their associationistic tendencies. As Richard C.
Allen notes in David Hartley on Human Nature, Hartley observes “that ideas regularly
call up other ideas and that their pattern of association are creations of experience and
habit” (4). Allen traces this basis directly to Locke: “[though] he dwelt upon the
irrational wildness of association…a general process of association is the basis for
Locke’s notion that ‘simple’ ideas of color, shape, smell and texture together form the
‘complex’ idea of, for example, an orange” (4).
Looking into the poems of the two poets, one can see that both poets start from a
common standpoint; they both see “substances” as they experience a rather universal
nature—trees, the sky, animals, other people. Frost lights on the physical scene, resting,
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finding importance and meaning here. He stays on the physical landscape: he “[goes] up
to the stone wall/ For a friendly visit” (“A Time to Talk”), he “fetch[es] the little calf”
(“The Pasture”), he goes for water. He describes natural things—substances, like birch
trees, blueberries, an ax-helve—as they are most readily apprehensible and in so doing,
deals in Lockean substance-ideas. Wordsworth, too, sees these substances but from a
distance and in a different way than does Frost. Wordsworth usually does not get
physically close to these other things. (An exception is “Nutting,” which will be explored
in the next chapter.) From this “bliss of solitude,” as Frederick Pottle calls it in “Eye and
the Object in the Poetry of Wordsworth,” the poet recognizes a spark in these other things
that triggers an emotion—a corresponding wind—inside him. Other ideas, then, are
associated with the substance at hand, or rather, in sight, and these associated ideas alter
the way he describes the physical scene. At this point, the poet is “describing” Lockean
modes rather than describing substance-ideas, which Frost describes. We know this
because, as Frederick Pottle says, the poet begins to “modify [the physical things] and
create [new things]” (274), and, as Locke notes, modes are not “works of nature…[but
rather] ideas made by the mind” (Woolhouse 120). For Wordsworth, ideas made by the
mind are associated ideas. Allen defines association as involving “a succession of
substitutes, whereby an emotion linked to one object or event is transferred to another
and at times transformed by the transference” (21). Wordsworth’s departure from the
physical and movement into describing modes instead of substance-ideas is the
transference, this kind of association of ideas to the physical thing that Allen is
describing. Wordsworth begins by observing nature from a vantage point of physical
solitude—a solitude that separates him physically from the other things in his lines.
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Then, the poet allows ideas to become associated to the physical things before him, and
these associated ideas take over the experience and lead him into what he thinks he can
really know, a knowable deeper meaning that lies beyond unknowable substances.
This process of association leads to transcendence, which occurs when
Wordsworth, from a distance so as to maintain his physical solitude, philosophically
plunges himself into the other things that appear in his lines. His transcendence is, as
Jacques Blondel in “Wordsworth and Solitude” says, the action of the poet “infusing his
spirit into [other things]” (27). The poet penetrates other things but since this penetration
is primarily philosophical (and since it ultimately leads to a kind of transcendence—a
kind of pulling out, in a manner of speaking, a lack of physical contact), the only
offspring produced is a kind of image of himself. So, the deeper meaning he finds is
about him—relates to himself and his experiences.
Frost’s poetic actions of staying on the physical landscape are equally
complicated ones. Though at times, by way of association of ideas, he swings from the
physical earth to the transcendent (romantic) landscape, he always swings back to earth
again. And he finds his meaning there. Wordsworth, on the other hand, seems to
presuppose that to find meaning necessitates transcending the physical; Frost does not.
“Earth’s the right place for love,” Frost says, affirming the importance of the physical
landscape; “I don’t know where it’s likely to go better” (“Birches” 52-53). Yet, this
distinction between Wordsworth and Frost is not as easy as saying the latter luxuriates
and finds as much meaning in the physical as the former does in the transcendent.
Though Pottle says “it is a great mistake to consider Wordsworth a descriptive poet”
(280), the poet does describe the physical landscape at times. Frost, though he stays on
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the physical landscape more than Wordsworth, does wander into emotional associations.
Yet a distinction can be drawn because never does Frost run and wallow in the physical
as Wordsworth does in the transcendent. One can see this tendency to refrain from such
excessive actions in “One Step Backward Taken,” in which the poet refuses to lose
himself in the hubbub of activity and the motion pushing forward around him:
I felt my standpoint shaken
In the universal crisis:
But with one step backward taken
I saved myself from going…[and]
A world turn loose went by me (8-12).
Frost exhibits decorum. He refrains, with his one step backward taken and with the
boundaries he so diligently erects in his lines, from getting caught up—and taken away—
in the other things around him.
Frost’s experiences, especially in his interactions with the physical, in his poems
are always with boundaries. In “Mending Wall,” for example, he is near his neighbor,
sharing a few words with him, but simultaneously they are building a wall between them.
“And so even as they build and close gaps,” as Judith Oster in Toward Robert Frost says,
likening the walls that always exist between the poet and the reader to the barrier between
the characters in the poem, “the two must keep the wall between them as they go” (8).
Thus, though Frost’s physical stance may be one of closer proximity to these other things
that appear in his lines, his philosophical stance is one of separateness. He chooses
philosophically to abstain from plunging himself into other things in his lines, from
infusing other things with his spirit; he refuses to appropriate these other things and their
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existence to his experience. They remain separate, as does he, and so maintain a separate
meaning apart from him.
Such philosophical separateness would defeat Wordsworth’s poetic purpose. The
distance that his physical solitude affords him enables him to achieve universal sympathy
in his poetry, philosophical unity. Allen Dunn mentions in “Out of the Veil of
Ignorance” that “Wordsworth…impl[ies] that [while] universal sympathy is the product
of distance…compromising [occurs with] specificity of social relationships” (20).
Universal sympathy is the aim of Wordsworth, and he does not want to compromise by
getting specific. Instead of particularizing, Wordsworth strives to relate the universal
meaning of the things he sees rather than some “thing” individual or specific. “There is
very little ‘energetic’ picture-taking in him,” says Hartman (5); that would particularize
too much for Wordsworth. The importance in his poetry is not found in the physical, the
natural, the specific. Wordsworth does, as Basil Willey notes in “On Wordsworth and
the Locke Tradition,” celebrate “figures like the Leech-Gatherer, Michael, or ‘Nature’s
Lady’: beings whose humanity is ennobled by close association with ‘mute insensate
things’” (121). However, the poet shows how this close association leads to a liberty to
transcend these natural things, and he finds the deeper meaning in them by following
associated ideas. The ultimate importance for Wordsworth lies in the poet; after the
death of the maid in “She Dwelt Among Untrodden Ways,” the poet ends with: “But she
is in her grave, and, oh,/ The difference to me!” (11, 12). To him the associations lead,
and within him the deeper meaning is revealed. Richard Allen describes this as an
outcome of the association of ideas: he says, “it is the actual occurrence of…
transferences and substitutes that effects the successive transformations of the self” (21).
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For Frost, the ultimate effect of experiencing nature is not the result on him or in
him. His finales seem more like anti-climactic sighs but not frustrated sighs that indicate
the futility of any attempts to understand life. As Poirier notes, in Frost’s work “You are
not led to believe that life is unintelligible or that your capacity to make sense of it
merely proves your triviality” (8). Along with this lack of frustration, however, the poet
is adamant about keeping the outer separate from the inner. This is in contrast to
Wordsworth’s (nearly) unsearchable, sublimely deep meanings that are important
because they are hinted at in nature, associated by the poet towards something deeper—
eventually reflecting the poet himself—and that ultimately affect and change the poet,
and through universal sympathy, all humankind. Frost “yards” himself more, as Poirier
says (93). The physical scene becomes too substantial, too important, and ultimately too
“other” to transcend completely. Though Frost does “like” (as in “Birches”) to digress
casually into romantic association at times—even association about himself, leading into
his own experiences—he ultimately remains true to the other thing—the event (in “On
the Heart…”), the thing (in “Birches”). Lentricchia says that Frost adopts the
“philosophy of common sense realism which posits a world ‘out there,’ independent of
our acts of perception” (3). This world “out there” is ultimately separate from him and
cannot be poetically appropriated and associated, absorbed into his own experiences nor
infused with his own spirit in order to get at the truth of it. This is a major distinction,
then, between the two poets—even though both see other things and even though both,
while they are looking at them, follow associations at times, Frost ultimately refuses to
transcend these “other things,” and Wordsworth readily associates ideas and transcends
them.
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When looking at the two poets’ poetic objectives, which becomes important when
considering this dialogue about meaning, yet again a seeming commonality turns into an
occasion for investigating the deep-seated differences between the two poets. As already
stated, Wordsworth desires a kind of universal effect in his poems. Frost shares this
desire. For instance, “Stopping by Woods,” John F. Lynen says in The Pastoral Art of
Robert Frost, “is not just a record of something that once happened to the poet; it points
outward from the moment described toward far broader areas of experience…
express[ing] the conflict, which everyone has felt” (3). Frost thus creates a sense of
common experience in his poems. Poirier also notes the way Frost strives for a common
connection with his readers, commenting on the poet’s “Emersonian capacity to make
people feel that in writing a poem he was being more like them rather than less” (24).
Through his lines, one gets the idea that Frost could be any average person—the farmer
in the field, the young boy picking apples, the old man, the hired man—but he never
assumes himself to be everyone. Wordsworth, on the other hand, does. By obliterating
the particulars, he, in a more Whitman-like manner, assumes, after finding a common and
universal association, that the other things in his lines become himself. He is the solitary
reaper because he carries the experience with him and allows it to affect him even after
her song “was heard no more.”
This difference can be further elaborated by looking at the relationship between
inner and outer and how it relates to the concept of transcendence. In the Preface
Wordsworth notes how in his poetry, “the feeling…gives importance to the action and
situation, and not the action and situation to the feeling” (735). This is a clear privileging
of the inner over the outer, justifying and explaining the “spontaneous overflow” of
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Wordsworth’s interior workings and revelations onto exterior observations—he
intentionally spills out the most important, the most meaningful onto and over the less
important (and in Lockean terms, the less-knowable). Wordsworth dives ultimately not
into nature but, rather, into himself. He “sees” other things around him, but he sees them
from the position of his own physical solitude and can thereby easily associate his own
ideas onto these things. Pottle notes that for Wordsworth, “the subject is a mental image
and the eye is that inward eye which is the bliss of solitude” (280). He stays at a physical
distance from his subjects, and this enables him not to really “know” these substances but
to write onto them what he sees in his inward eye. For example, in “The Pet Lamb,” the
poet has to “o’er [look] the hedge” (3) before him so that he can see the pet-lamb and its
keeper. This distance sounds similar to what Frost maintains, but the effect is markedly
different. Wordsworth takes the image of the other thing and writes over it. In this
poem, the pet lamb becomes the poet’s soul, not a thing in itself.
Frost erects boundaries in order to resist just this kind of transcendent experience,
this kind of metaphoric renaming (which is an effect of transcendence) of physical
(exterior) things in terms of personal (interior) associated ideas. There is, to appropriate
Hartman’s quote about Wordsworth, some realistic “picture-taking” in Frost. But, just as
a picture-taker frames the picture, defining its edges, so does Frost with the things he
pictures in his poetry. He is always controlling and limiting all else in his lines. Oster
mentions Frost’s comparison between the poem and “the will braving alien
entanglements” (1); boundaries must be established in order not to become fully
“inhabited by alien shapes” (14) and, we might add, in order not to infuse the
surroundings with oneself. In “The Ax-Helve,” though the poet finds himself in a foreign
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home, he remains in control as the boundary-setter, the one who “must judge…what
[Baptiste] knew about an ax” (41). And as the poet becomes “judge,” Baptiste, later in
the poem, makes “his defense” (83) before the poet as they discuss education and
knowledge. Frost, though he gets closer and sometimes even touches the other things in
his lines, ultimately sees them as different, as things that he must judge and keep separate
from himself.
This idea of separateness relates to the poets’ relationships with nature at large as
well. (I am grouping “nature” into the category of “other things” in the poets’ lines.)
The differences between the two poets in this area can best be described using concepts
from David Hartley’s associationism. Wordsworth seems to have a reckless abandon in
his relationship with nature as he describes it in his lines. He asks question after question
as he philosophically plunges deeper and deeper into it, ultimately answering those
questions himself and finding and revealing himself in the process. As Geoffrey Hartman
states, “[Wordsworth] constantly details the state of his mind. When [he] depicts an
object he is also depicting himself or, rather, a truth about himself, a self-acquainted
revelation” (5). And there is no reservation in this act for him. This lack of reservation
in Wordsworth’s action sounds like the exceeding of “due limit[s],” which is how Allen
describes David Hartley’s pleasure/pain boundary. In explaining Hartley’s philosophy,
Allen quotes him saying that “a moderate degree of distention in the parts” (this, as I see
it, could apply to physical and philosophical parts), “is necessary for their growth and
pleasurable state…[in order] to cause a visible solution of continuity” (122). A solution
of continuity is “a medical term of art that referred to the displacement, rupture, or
dissolution of previously connected physical structure” (122). Using this term to speak in
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philosophical terms about the two poets, I mean to say that Wordsworth does not mind
“stretching” himself into other things; he does not mind the pull in order to be able next
time to run further past previous boundaries in his search in other things for meaning.
Frost, on the other hand, does not stretch, at least not in this way, so as to cause “a
rupture or dissolution of previously connected [philosophic] structure[s].” The
“disruption” (Allen 123) that results is exactly what Wordsworth’s questions intend—a
stretching and a pulling of himself deeper and deeper into moments of sublime thought.
Hartley, furthermore, is confident that “the power of nature restores all minute
solution of continuity [or breaks]…so that the body receives no perceptible detriment
from the single instances” (Allen 124). And Wordsworth, likewise, believes in this
restorative power of nature. As he stretches himself into it, he finds solace and healing in
it. In “I Wandered Lonely As a Cloud,” for instance, when the poet suffers from “vacant
or…pensive mood,” the memories of the beautiful daffodils “flash upon that inward
eye…And then [his] heart with pleasure fills,/ And dances with the daffodils” (20, 21, 2324), illustrating well Hartley’s healing “powers of nature…to repair the damage that is
the correlative of pain” (Allen 125).
Not surprisingly, though Frost seems to prefer the physical natural scene more
than does Wordsworth, the modern poet has a greater tendency to distrust nature. As is
suggested in “Design,” there is no guarantee that there is a benevolent Maker, so Frost
dares to plunge into nature only so far and only within his own set boundaries. As Lynen
points out, “[Frost’s] consciousness [here in “Stopping by Woods”] seems on the verge of
freeing itself from ordinary life, as if it were about to dissolve in the shadowy blank, but
his mind holds back from this” (3). There is a jerking away, almost like an abrupt
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awakening from a near fall into sleep. This is Frost recovering from that space that is, as
Pottle describes it, desirable for Wordsworth, the space where “the edges of things begin
to waver and fade out” (284). A space of such indistinct edges is one in which
Wordsworth is stretching into other things, where the solution of continuity occurs for
him. Frost, on the contrary, does not stretch and bend and fall into things as Wordsworth
does. For Frost, a solution of continuity would be disastrous. Hartley says, “a solution of
continuity at the molecular level occurs at that point at which a nerve’s vibrations become
chaotic” (Allen 124), and chaos is exactly what Frost wants to avoid at all costs. For
Frost, only “permanent damage” (Allen 124) comes from exhaustive and chaotic action.
“In Frost’s poetry,” as Oster says, “…he was imposing order [and we might add
“necessary” to describe that order] on what otherwise seemed unmanageable and chaotic”
(7). In Frost there are stiff penalties for not upholding the set boundaries. The overdoers,
those who overexert themselves beyond reasonable limits, wreak havoc on themselves
and on others. In “Out, Out—”, the poet laments, “Call it a day, I wish they might have
said” (10). It is the end of the day, a definite boundary, and any work beyond this
moment is excessive. Yet, the boy continues to saw on a piece of wood, and ultimately
he loses his hand and then dies. Poirier notes that in “Good Hours” after moving
“beyond decorums of space, [the poet] ‘repents’” (90); it is only the poet who is able at
times to “[walk] beyond limits [and we might add “safely”] and then [return] to them”
(Poirier 91). In terms of his poetics, Frost always returns to his boundaries. He writes
within set forms, and he equates poetry without form to tennis without a net, something
ridiculous and (perhaps) dangerous.
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Frost’s desire for order and boundaries seems logical when considering his
physical closer proximity to these other things that appear in his lines. He touches these
other things, lives nearer to them, talks to them. In order to maintain himself as separate,
in order to maintain a personal identity apart from these other things, he must construct
boundaries. Wordsworth, however, does not touch these other things in the same way.
He does not get so close to them because his boundaries keep him more physically
separate. They keep him separate from these other things and enable him philosophically
speaking to run with abandon toward and through his conception of other things (rather
than into them, their physical beings).
After looking at the differing notions of boundaries in the poets’ lines, one can see
that Wordsworth’s poetical comportment seems freer than Frost’s, but it is likely that
Frost would call Wordsworth’s style epistemological extravagance. In “On
Extravagance” Frost says he sees “the universe as a kind of exaggeration…[,] everybody
trying to make it mean something more than it is” (903). Frost has a sense of decorum.
He refuses to add in what is not there already in nature. “The extravagance lies in ‘it
sometimes seems as if,’” Frost says (904). Wordsworth often journeys into such
“seemings”; his lines are more speculations about than description of the natural objects
themselves. He fills his lines with “obstinate questions”: queries—“With chips is the
carpenter strewing his floor?” from “The Two Thieves”—, with “what if’s”—“What if
the bee love not these barren boughs?” from “Lines Left upon a Seat in a Yew-tree”—,
perhapses—“Perhaps the plaintive numbers flow/ For old…things” from “Solitary
Reaper”—, and seemings—“[the pet lamb] seemed to feast with head and ears.” These
questions and queries, speculations and assumptions lead Wordsworth, as he sees it, on
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an imaginative, associative process in search of truth. As Pottle says, “Wordsworth and
Coleridge…wished to make imagination not merely creative but a power for
apprehending truth” (283). Poirier says that to Frost “‘extravagance’ in poetry
[is]…saying what is only possibly, or even what is only unlikely to be, the case” (86).
Such associative and transcendent journeys are unnecessary for Frost in order for him to
find meaning and truth, but very necessary, truth-seeking ones for Wordsworth.
In reference not only to Frost’s conception of truth and what one can know but in
other ways as well, William James’ effect on Frost is very important and is discussed by
many critics—Judith Oster, Frank Lentricchia, Lawrance Thompson. Frost himself
called James his “greatest inspiration when [he] was a student” (Thompson 536). Allen
points out the associationism that exists in James’ philosophy; he says James “attributes
the perception of objects to ‘association…between impression of different senses” (151).
James says, “In fact the ‘objects’ of our perception…are nothing but clusters of qualities
which through simultaneous stimulation have so coalesced that the moment one is excited
actually it serves as a sign or a cue for the idea of the others to arise” (Allen 151). This is
association as Hartley describes it. So Frost’s associations can be seen as Hartleyan
associationism woven into Jamesian pragmatism. This further entangles him
philosophically with Wordsworth, who, as Beatty notes, “derived his inspiration and
knowledge…[from] the general stock of English thought, especially the stock of English
philosophic thought, as expressed in the system of David Hartley” (37).
There are also similarities between Hartley’s queries and Frost’s own. For
instance, Allen describes an event when Hartley as a boy was “swinging backwards and
forwards upon a gate…meditating upon the nature of his own mind; wishing to find out
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how man was made; to what purpose, and for what future end” (27). This sounds like
Frost in “Birches” swinging “Toward heaven, till the tree could bear no more,/ But
dipped its top and set me down again./ That would be good,” he says, “both going and
coming back” (56-58). Frost is, as is Hartley, meditating upon the nature of his own
mind—how it works, where it takes him—wanting to fly into emotional associations—to
believe a boy bent the birches—but returning to earth—knowing only ice storms could be
the cause for the bending branches.
Between the two poets, the distinctions important for this study are appropriately
based on Locke and Hartley. It is not that Frost thinks he can know substances; as stated
above, describing is not asserting knowledge. He is, rather, doubting the describer’s
ability to find universal meaning and truth by looking below or above or deeper into these
other things. He also trusts, as is continually illustrated in his relationship with nature,
these other things less than does Wordsworth. And Frost mistrusts association of ideas to
lead him supposedly to truth. Hartley says, “The pleasures of imagination [of which we
can include association of ideas]…are to men in the early part of their adult age, what
playthings are to children;…they lead them to the knowledge of many important truths
relating to themselves, the external world, and its author” (Beatty 112). Wordsworth
would agree with this statement. Frost would likely agree that imagination and emotional
association of ideas are like playthings that show him more about himself—about why
and how he enjoys them rather than about the truth of themselves. He would disagree
that these lead to deeper knowledge of the external world and to its maker. As
Wordsworth seeks out truth using these tools, Frost denies their efficacy. There is a gap
that cannot be bridged in Frost between other things and the poet—not through
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observation, association, or touching. For Wordsworth, however, there is something
divine left in nature that is reachable by the poet. In this belief, Wordsworth’s logic
warrants another look before calling it completely Lockean. In Empirical Truths and
Critical Fictions, Cathy Caruth says that for Locke, the “light” of revelation is “natural
rather than divine” (6); “this is not revelation but rational experience” (6). Wordsworth
believes in revelation, a divine spark that he can reach and/or can receive by transcending
the physical. Frost believes there could be a spark in nature but doubts anyone’s ability,
including his own, to see it, arguing, repeatedly, that it is an extravagance to spend time
musing over it, not a crime or even necessarily an ignorant action, just an extravagance.
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CHAPTER TWO:
ON WORDSWORTH
William Wordsworth’s belief in something divine—as opposed to Locke’s belief,
as Cathy Caruth describes it, in a natural source of revelation—is evident at first sight.
One might look, for instance, into his tendency to associate ideas and to transcend the
physical for such evidence. These tendencies manifest themselves in different ways, yet
it is his seemings and perhapses mentioned in the previous chapter that illustrate most
evidently his groping after something divine. In these conjectures, the poet is dealing in,
is relating, what could be rather than what is. He is not merely practicing optimism but is
moving from the physical toward something else, something deeper. He is reaching
beyond the other things that appear in his lines for something transcendent. And
epistemologically speaking, the distance between transcending the physical and seeking
the divine is not a large one. The title of Louis Roy’s book Le Sentiment de
Transcendence, experience de Dieu? draws this connection between transcendence and
the divine. Andrew Tallon in his review of the book notes that Roy says “Transcendent
experience is apprehension of the infinite through feeling” (863); applying this statement
to Wordsworth’s philosophy, I would read “the infinite” as the poet’s “something
divine.” Wordsworth’s movements of transcending are gestures towards a divine thing,
and I read what Roy calls “feelings” as Wordsworth’s associated ideas.
For instance, in the poem “Nutting,” Wordsworth begins, “It seems a day…/ One
of those heavenly days that cannot die” (1, 3). He does not say that the day merely is; on
the contrary, “It seems a day,” and the reader is already floating above the physical world.
The word “heavenly” elevates the reader further into the divine realm—all days die, but
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this is one that cannot, symbolizing the infiniteness of the meaning behind what this day
represents. This poem, though it “seems” to be a common tale of a boy’s experience in a
hazelnut thicket, is ultimately one of a transcendent experience. The line omitted from
the above citation—“(I speak of one from many singled out)” (2)—articulates
Wordsworth’s associated ideas. He is not observing an event occurring before him in the
present; he is observing in the eye of his mind, in his memory, an event from the past. He
is writing his experiences from the past onto his present. Eric Gidal says, “Wordsworth’s
configuration of his recollective mind as a wanderer…echoes a long tradition of the
representation and enactment of memory as a physical repository of objects and images”
(457). Line two of “Nutting” indicates that Wordsworth does have a storehouse of
memories, of objects and images. After transcending the present and the physical world
with all its boundaries and limitations, the associationist poet selects one idea from his
memory that sends him in an appropriate direction to make the point he is trying to
convey and creates his poem from it.
Wordsworth transcends the physical because to him things, people, life itself are
more than the physical. So he omits many of the physical, quotidian details of life, even
such details about his own desires and life in general. As Anne Mellor says, “we never
hear whether he is hot or cold, whether he washes himself or defecates, whether he has
sexual desires or intercourse” (148). And though in most poets’ lines there is no dwelling
upon these details, in Wordsworth’s there is an exceptional dearth of them, essentially a
complete eclipsing of the physical. In his opinion, there are deeper meanings inherent in
the things that appear in his lines. “Wordsworth scorned the merely analytic vision of the
naturalist,” says Frederick Pottle, “…because in his opinion that kind of apprehension
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empties the object of life and meaning by detaching it from its ground” (280). Whereas
“ground” would typically infer an attachment to the physical world, Wordsworth’s
“ground” is not the physical earth but a transcendent reality. According to him, the
deeper meaning of things is not found in their physical manifestations; only this
transcendent reality provides to Wordsworth the deeper meaning, and he accesses it by
“look[ing] steadily at [his] subject[s]” (“Preface” 736). This decision to “look steadily”
begins the process of transcendence. The poet refuses to relate only the physical because
he, first, refuses to see in a merely physical sense. Alexander Eliot says that the romantic
vision “involves not just the eye but the mind as well…” (109). He elaborates: “thinking
and feeling are involved in seeing” (109). Wordsworth’s “seeing” is a combination of his
thinking and feeling. The thinking is his associating ideas, which spring from his
feelings. As Morris Dickstein says, “Wordsworth tried to…[look] for deeper, more
authentic sources of feeling, either in his own mind or in the unlikely human material
around him” (256). I would amend Dickstein’s statement by noting that Wordsworth
looks at the “human material around him” initially but in looking “for deeper, more
authentic sources of feeling,” he finally refers to his own mind—his associated ideas that
do come, to speak in Lockean terms, from his experiences in nature. The associated ideas
thus lead the poet into a transcendent reality and in closer proximity to something divine.
Wordsworth’s process of transcendence is not always viewed in a favorable light.
L. J. Swingle, among other critics, criticizes the poet by classifying him within the realm
of “attempt criticism” (8). “This type of criticism,” says Swingle, “repeatedly presenting
Wordsworth as a poet who ‘attempts’ to accomplish things, builds up a picture of
persistent artistic incompetence” (8). Are the poet’s could-be’s fulfilled? Swingle and
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others say no. These critics do not see Wordsworth’s transcendence as complete, as fully
reaching anything divine. Geoffrey Hartman, on the other hand, finds value in
Wordsworth’s seemings. In describing “The Solitary Reaper,” Hartman says,
“Wordsworth adopts the stance of surmise which points to liberty and expansiveness of
spirit” (9). Hartman sees the possibilities in the poet’s seemings and affirms that they
indicate his poetic ability rather than a lack thereof. Eric Gidal, in contrast to Swingle as
well, also finds fulfillment and creative productivity in Wordsworth’s poetry, particularly
in the poet’s “art of memory” which Gidal calls “a poetic realization of the paradoxes
attendant upon the empiricist internalization of both the form and the content of the
classical rhetorical art” (474). Wordsworth’s mind is fulfilling and creating, in Gidal’s
opinion; the poet’s mind “memorially transforms and foundationally constitutes the very
identity of the self” (474). Wordsworth is fulfilling his attempts to reach something
deeper, something divine, by creating a deeper conception of himself in his lines.
In his attack, Swingle quotes Kenneth Johnston’s critique that Wordsworth is
usually “praying for inspiration rather than essaying its realization” (9). To critics such
as these, Wordsworth is an impotent poet. His “prayers” to them infer a lack of action
and creative results. Are “prayers” a waste of time? Is praying energy lost because it is a
fruitless activity? (Wordsworth’s philosophy here becomes his theology.) Not, perhaps,
to someone who professes religious faith and a belief in a divine being, who can be
reached only through prayer, and William Ulmer does argue that there is clear evidence
to prove that Wordsworth was religious. Perhaps readers can look at Wordsworth’s
surmises as “prayers” of a sort. Ulmer does qualify the poet’s Christianity: “Scholars
who accept Wordsworth’s Christianity…allow that it was doctrinely imprecise and
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selective” (357). Nonetheless, Ulmer argues, the poet’s imagination is “less unreligious
than religiously revisionary” (355). If Wordsworth is religious and his “prayers,” as
Johnston calls them, or seemings, as I do, are efforts to reach his conception of a divine,
perhaps they are less unproductive than Johnston and Swingle accuse him of being and
more intentionally creative.
Who—or what—is the divine to whom Wordsworth reaches? Since he refuses to
rest in the physical and the other things that appear in his lines become “more” than they
physically are, the transcendence is obvious. But to what height is he reaching? Ulmer
quotes M. H. Abrams as saying that the typical romantic tendency is “to naturalize the
supernatural, to humanize the divine” (350). This appropriately describes Wordsworth.
In “Influence of Natural Objects,” the poet longs for “high objects” (9) and a “sanctifying
by…/ Both pain and fear” (12-13), but the end desire is not to see a figure of a separate
and holy “god.” Rather, the poet longs for these higher movements “until we recognise/
A grandeur in the beatings of the heart” (14). The focus is ultimately on the human, not
the physical man but the transcendent reality within the person. More specifically, the
focus for Wordsworth is himself. In order to transcend, he relates his own associated
ideas—his ideas onto things, over things, and (usually) instead of things. His own mind
furnishes ideas from his own past experiences that he writes onto these things. He is the
destination of the transcendence because all his association is about himself. The poet
thus ultimately experiences himself. He becomes the divine god figure, the transcendent
reality. “The mind and memory of man is now ‘divine,’” says Gidal, “having power of
grasping the highest reality through a magically activated imagination” (458). The
divinity Wordsworth finds is ultimately within himself.
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In “The Poet’s Dream,” the poet gives readers a picture of him becoming such a
god. In the prequel to the poem, “The Norman Boy,” the poet portrays a devout boy who
lives alone. The boy fastens a cross over his crudely constructed home, and amidst a
ferocious storm the poet sees the “dear holy shepherd-boy breathe a prayer of earnest
heart” (30). This picture of a devout boy is followed by the poet’s dream in which the
poet becomes a “good Angel” (28) who raptures the boy up out of his situation and flies
him to where he wants to go. The poet is thus the one who rescues the boy and, it can be
inferred, answers the prayers of the boy. Swingle complains that “Wordsworth doesn’t
make things happen in a poem” (9), but the action in this poem, in which the poet
becomes a divine force of sorts, could call Swingle’s statement into question. “Strong as
an Eagle with my charge I glided,” writes the poet (37); strong is the poet to change
things, to improve things. Swingle would likely argue that this is “the poet’s dream” and,
therefore, not part of reality, and that that divergence proves the poet’s lack of
productivity. It seems, however, that Swingle’s proscriptive conception of making things
happen philosophically differs from Wordsworth’s. The critic seems to want action in
the physical realm, results that can be picked up and weighed and held, while the poet
strives to transcend this realm and reach something beyond.
In seeking something beyond, Wordsworth, as in “The Poet’s Dream,” becomes
god, many times, because (again) of the way he looks at the other things around him.
“[Wordsworth’s] eye that looks steadily,” Pottle says, “is not the physical eye. The
subject is a mental image and the eye is that inward eye which is the bliss of solitude”
(280). Though this “eye” is not the physical eye, it does represent something inherent to
the poet; it does not represent something divine in the sense that it is something apart
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from him. The eye does not see as a result of revelation from an exterior source. In
Caruth’s looking at the eye, Locke reappears; that is, Caruth describes how Locke
explains understanding by comparing it to the eye: “The Understanding [is] like the Eye”
(6). Locke’s “Light we can let in upon our own Minds,” Caruth emphasizes “is natural
rather than divine” (6). Caruth also notes that “this is not revelation but rational
experience” (6). The move for Locke is away from a divine god who might work in unempirical ways. Wordsworth’s philosophical move is similar but more complicated. He
does, according to Arthur Beatty, “[approach] the problem of mind from the angle of
Locke, basing his whole theory on the assumption that thought originates in experience”
(108); yet Wordsworth’s move is away from a divine “other” being toward finding god in
himself. M. H. Abrams quotes Wordsworth as saying, “the materials of a poem come
from within” (47). Interiority is of prime importance. The external setting is written over
with ideas: Wordsworth’s past experiences become substances for him to associate onto
the present physical scene. He transcends the physical in search of a divine only to allow
association to take him and his readers deeper into himself, or as Ulmer says,
Wordsworth turns “from Jehovah to ‘the soul of man’” (355). I would add specifically to
the soul of himself. In this case, the poet’s “prayers” would be to himself, supplications
to his own ability to make the things he sees and relates better, to relate their deeper
meanings and values through transcendence and association.
Like L. J. Swingle, Linda Brigham argues that Wordsworth fails as a poet-maker.
She says Wordsworth has many intentions in his lines but none is fulfilled: “An intention
after its recall constantly suffers the threat of annihilation by the revisionary gaze of its
own future…. [An] interrupted intention, is… an initial movement that never coalesces
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into an individual with a face” (208-209). Brigham’s comments confirm the statements
made in chapter one referring to the impotence of Wordsworth’s penetration. In his lines,
the “intentions” are the other things that are mentioned—they are the physical things, the
sparks, that the poet sees and that excite his mind. Brigham says of an intention that it is
“something whose successors annihilate it entirely” (209); so are these other things in
Wordsworth’s lines. Their successors are the ideas he associates onto them. The petlamb becomes his soul; all the things in “The Simplon Pass”—brook, road, woods,
winds, rocks, crags—become “like the workings of one mind” (16); the city in
“Composed upon Westminster Bridge” becomes the “calm so deep” that the poet feels
(11).
While Wordsworth focuses in order to concentrate on one thing, his lens is
associative by nature so that the “thing” that he ultimately relates in his lines is not the
physical “thing” with which the poem begins. The poet has written of his desire to unify
the things he sees, these other things he pictures in his lines. A mind can have no rest,
Wordsworth affirms, “among a multitude of objects, of which it either cannot make one
whole, or from which it cannot single out one individual whereupon may be concentrated
the attention divided or distracted by a multitude” (Gidal 445). Multitudes are
distracting. Wordsworth’s desire to depart from them is seen in his gesture in the
“Influence of Natural Objects”; the poet, says he, “Glanced sideway, leaving the
tumultuous throng” (48). Multitudes and throngs lead the mind away from the depth—
the transcendent depth—that Wordsworth longs to experience and relate. Dickstein notes
that in Wordsworth there is an “undifferentiated togetherness he projects” on scenes
(262). This togetherness is a result of Wordsworth’s own mental processes, in which he
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projects his own associated ideas onto the scenes before him. The togetherness is not a
physical phenomenon but, ultimately, a mental one. In considering an inner self looking
at a landscape, J. H. Van den Berg questions the “devaluation of extraneousness” that
results from a fear of “loss of understanding” (60). Wordsworth, with his strong and
growing inner self, does not want to run the risk of losing understanding, so he does
devalue extraneousness. The extra things are covered, collected, and what is projected is
a unified notion of the poet’s associated ideas. Yet, this lack of acceptance of difference
ultimately devalues all the beings that are different, i.e. all the “others” in the poet’s lines.
Examples of this devaluing can be found in Wordsworth’s “Lucy” poems.
Dickstein says Wordsworth’s “Lucy will never become fully human…[; she is] alive only
in the poet’s grieving” (259). Though this is literally true—in the poems we learn that
Lucy is dead—, it is also figuratively true on a larger scale of many of the other things
and people that appear in Wordsworth’s lines. They, too, will never be fully real because
they are not fully related. They are annihilated as far as the reality of their particular
experiences goes, by the poetic movements of Wordsworth, his transcending them and
projecting his associated ideas onto them.
The poet relates a similar unifying vision of the view he has from a few miles
above Tintern Abbey. Instead of dwelling on the particulars of the scene, in this poem he
notes:
…Once again
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs,
That on a wild secluded scene impress
Thought of a more deep seclusion; and connect
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The landscape with the quiet of the sky. (4-8)
As he looks at the scene, the features of it align and configure themselves before him to
impress a deeper thought in the poet. He beholds the many facets of the landscape, but
instead of particularizing, he receives a unified vision of the view. The cliffs impress
upon him one thought, one meaning, and he relates this. The effect in the poem is one of
unity among the natural things before him to affirm one meaning, not particularized,
independent meanings.
At the same time he works to annihilate difference, the poet is also flirting with
many other things in his lines—mentioning them, observing them, enjoying them. He
watches the girl grow in “Three Years She Grew” and calls her his own: “How soon my
Lucy’s race was run!” (38, emphasis added). He enjoys the company of the butterfly and
says, “Stay near me—do not take thy flight!” (“To a Butterfly” 1). Does he love them?
This question is a logical one considering the poet is an adherent of the associationism of
David Hartley, whose “entire project,” according to Richard C. Allen, “can be understood
to address the question, How does a child learn to love?” (17). If Hartley focuses his
philosophy on love, would his philosophical protégé not at least consider the concept
important? Hartley sees a direct relationship between associationism and love. He
believed, “All children will in time grow into beings who overflow with love” (Allen 17).
“In time” suggests through the course of a life of associations—emotions being linked “to
one object or event [and then] transferred to another and at times transformed by the
transference…[resulting in] successive transformations of the self” (21).
Love in Wordsworth is not easily recognized as such, however. In “Stanzas
Written in my Pocket-Copy…” Wordsworth describes how the main character, the “Great
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wonderer,” disappears periodically and that “Some thought he was a lover and did woo”
(32), but actually he is a poet and “verse was what he had been wedded to” (34). In this
poem, love is presented as something given to poesy, not to other people. In another
poem, presumably addressed to a person who is the object of love, the poet admits
“sometimes I in thee have loved/ My fancy’s own creation” (“Yes!” 4). Wordsworth
seems to desire to turn a love of nature into a love of man. Dickstein agrees, saying that
“Wordsworth’s whole body of work can be seen as an effort to reconcile…solitary
introspection with human sympathy” (265). One of the poet’s poetical descendents tests
this Wordsworthian premise about love. In Alastor, Shelley seems to be asking whether a
love of nature can lead to a kind of love of fellow (wo)man. Donna Richardson, in her
assessment of Shelley’s work, states that the poet is skeptical of the possibility of this
kind of affection transference. She says that Shelley seems to be asserting that “…trying
to love nature first will not lead to love of man” (186). The question of love, especially
love of the things Wordsworth is describing, is complicated. J. H. Van den Berg explains
love in Freudian terms, and these descriptions seem to fit Wordsworth’s conception.
Freud calls love libido and says it “leaves the inner self when the inner self has become
too full. In order to prevent it from being torn, the I has to aim itself on objects outside
the self” (64-65). Since the fact is that when Wordsworth aims his love/libido at other
things all that is related is himself, it seems that the cause might be an over-full inner self.
Perhaps a rewriting of Hartley’s love incorporating Freud’s concept of the libido would
provide a richer explanation with which to describe Wordsworth’s poetic process and
effect.
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To further explain the poet’s philosophical stance, we must revisit the debate
mentioned in the previous chapter concerning the search for fact and distinguishing fact
from opinion—as seen by Bacon and Locke and extending to Wordsworth. For this poet,
however, the search for empirical fact is a move beyond the physical and into a further
search for transcendent truth. Wordsworth, as has already been argued, searches
deeply—transcendently—for the truth of one thing. In this search the imagination and
(even more so) the memory aid him. Eliot says, “Imagination, in its first and most
important meaning is simply a technique for apprehending reality” (109). Pottle extends
this idea: “In the reigning psychology of Locke extended by Hartley, imagination and
fancy—pretty much interchangeable terms—were handled as modes of memory….
Wordsworth and Coleridge…wished to make imagination not merely creative but a
power for apprehending the truth” (283, emphasis added). Wordsworth’s search is more
than a search for reality; it is a search for truth. And his search requires more than
imagination; it requires the thing of which imagination is a mode: memory. This is the
ultimate key to the poet’s search for truth. Memory’s importance is due to the fact that it
is the source of all Wordsworth’s associations; it is the “storehouse of… ideas” (Gidal
458). Gidal quotes Locke defining memory: “[it is] the power to revive again in our
minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid
aside out of sight” (458). Wordsworth’s memories are based in Lockean logic—all
empirically sound. They enable him to associate former thoughts, ideas, experiences
onto the things he presently sees and relates. In his lines the poet resurrects the past: he
brings forth associated ideas from it and applies them onto the present thing before him to
reveal a transcendent truth—an inherent meaning—about the (present) thing.
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The importance of memory in Wordsworth is evident, and Dickstein describes
how this is true in “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud.” The critic says, “the scene…[is]
providing [the poet] with emotional capital for difficult times to come” (263). The past
experience was not fully appreciated when it occurred, but the importance is that it is
remembered. So in the future, when the poet is in “vacant or in pensive mood” (20), the
past can and does comfort him: “What did not happen then [in the past] is now endlessly
reenacted,” Dickstein notes (263). The “inward eye” (23) looks into the past, and the
ideas of the former experience are associated and projected onto the present, ultimately
changing the present—just as associations change the way the physical thing in
Wordsworth’s lines look. In the end the poet’s heart elevates from its vacant mood to
dance “with the daffodils” (24). As Dickstein says, “Time and absence have brought the
scene inwardly alive for him” (263); I would add that instead of time and absence,
memory and the association of ideas that is possible because of it are the important agents
here.
This key concept of association helps further explain Wordsworth’s relationship
with reality and the truth. Association is a soft art in that it softens physical reality.
Pottle remarks how “the edges of things begin to waver and fade out” in Wordsworth’s
lines (284), and this accurately illustrates association. It changes the shapes, sizes, colors,
overall appearance of things. The other things pictured in his lines lose their sharp,
clearly-defined physical edges; their physical beings seem to melt to reveal more clearly
their inherent meaning—revealed through transcendence and association of ideas. Beatty
quotes Samuel Rogers who notes “The associating principle…addresses our finer
feelings, and gives exercise to every mild and generous propensity” (103). With
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association, Wordsworth portrays reality more generously and mildly. For instance,
Hartman, in describing Milton’s evocation of Mulciber’s fall from heaven, says, “…while
the fable is being told, our mind is released from the harsh pressure of a higher truth, and
a meditative pause…calms the poem” (10). Association in Wordsworth releases the
reader’s mind from the harsh pressure of a specific truth, namely a physical truth. The
reader can rest in the associations related while the poet transcends the physical to search
for a transcendent truth.
Birds’ songs provide Wordsworth with easy access to associations in his poetry.
In “To The Cuckoo,” the bird’s song is the spark for the poet’s associating mind. The
poet says, “Thy two fold shout I hear…Thou bringest unto me a tale/ Of visionary hours”
(6, 11-12). He hears the bird, who is not important because he is a physical creature but
because he suggests something deeper:
Even yet thou art to me
No bird, but an invisible thing,
A voice, a mystery;
The same whom in my schoolboy days
I listened to…. (14-18)
The poet’s mind associates the bird’s song with a tale from his past, and the present,
physical scene is transcended with associated ideas to get at the depth of the experience.
That is, the poet remembers and writes of his experience of hearing the same cry in his
“schoolboy days” and how that sent him on a search for the source of the sound: “Still
longed for, never seen” (24). Though this statement may initially seem to fit the attempt
criticism of which Swingle and others accuse Wordsworth, the tone behind the statement
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is not one of frustration at never seeing the source. The deeper meanings in things are
never to be seen anyway. The tone is, rather, one of satisfaction, as one can “hear” in the
poet’s addressing the bird as “O blessed Bird!” (29). The poem becomes an allegory of
poetic experience made possible by association and transcendence.
In “The Reverie of Poor Susan,” a similar experience occurs. However, in this
poem the association is not the poet’s, per se, but the character’s. A “Thrush…sings
loud” (2), and this “note of enchantment” (5) transports the unfortunate Susan to a
pleasing scene: “She sees…a vision of trees…[and a] small cottage…The only dwelling
on earth that she loves” (5-6,11-12). Poor Susan transcends the physical by associating
her past onto her present. The poet in “Cuckoo” says “[I] listen, till I do beget/ That
golden time again” (27-28), and his experience seems to end victoriously. Poor Susan, as
opposed to (and likely because she is not) the poet, loses her vision in the end: “And the
colours…all [pass] away from her eyes!” (16).
To explain the different endings of these two poems, Dickstein’s view of two
kinds of solitude becomes helpful. The critic says solitude “is the condition for
Wordsworthian sincerity and self-exploration, yet it is also the condition that he most
devotes himself to overcoming” (260). The poet in “Cuckoo” is self-exploring, delving
into his past to lend depth to the experience in the present. Poor Susan seems just to be
looking for a refuge from the brutal present, using association in an escapist way.
Dickstein notes that “solitude enables man to commune with himself, to tap the springs of
personal power, yet it also cuts him off from other men, who may be trapped in their own
forms of isolation” (260). Susan is using transcendence of her present into her past to
isolate herself. Through her associations, she is not enabled to commune more
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effectively with herself or others. The poet in “Cuckoo” is. He can impose the unifying
vision on the cuckoo’s song he hears in the present and the one he heard in the past and
commune with them in terms of how they affect/affected him.
Though characters like Susan rarely appear victorious, Wordsworth associates in
many important ways with his female characters. These associations differ a bit from the
ones related to memory; these are not necessarily from the poet’s own past experiences.
Yet, these associations are also departures from the physical scene in order to relate depth
to the present experience. Just as Dickstein says Lucy never becomes a full human,
neither do other females in Wordsworth. In “The Westmoreland Girl,” the eponymous
heroine rescues a lamb from a “frightful current” (17). The description of her is elevated
with divine associations. She is called a “guardian angel [who]/ Came with succour from
above” (23-24). She is also called the
…fearless lamb-deliv’rer,
Woman-grown, meek-hearted, sage…[who is]
Watchful as a wheeling eagle
Constant as a soaring lark, [and]
Should the country need a heroine,
She might prove our Maid of Arc. (81-88)
This completely unreal description of the girl abounds in associations, ones that take the
reader everywhere but to the physical person. As Pottle says, Wordsworth simplifies the
natural object again and again, until it “becomes the correlative of a single emotion”
(280). The emotion of heroism (referring back to Lockean logic, a mode) is what
Wordsworth wanted to relate. The poet is not trying to describe the substance-idea—the
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physical girl—but, rather, to relate the truth of this mode she suggests to the poet—
heroism.
In another poem, the female persona Wordsworth mentions is ephemeral and
transparent enough to blow off the page and through which he can read his other ideas:
She was a Phantom of delight
When she first gleamed upon my sight;
A lovely Apparition, sent
To be a moment’s ornament. (1-4)
This female is not only a member of the ghost—as opposed to flesh and blood—family;
she is also called a “moment’s ornament.” She dresses up or frames his idea which is the
crux of the poem. He says this female was a “Spirit, yet a Woman, too!” (12). The
former is the main focus to the associating poet. In the spirit form she is transparent, so
readers can understand his ideas, which he sees as giving substance to the physical.
Ultimately Wordsworth thinks that the idea realm is what does give substance. He
acknowledges the physical: “And now I see with eye serene/ The very pulse of the
machine; A Being breathing thoughtful breath” (21-23), but he ends with the important
fact that the physical is not all, because this phantom has “something of angelic light”
(30). The poet always wants to reach the transcendent truth behind the physical being.
This habit of reaching beyond the physical beings in his verse to attain a
transcendent meaning helps classify, according to many critics, Wordsworth’s poetical
practices in terms of gender. The fact that he is a transcender and that his lines show a
lack of sympathy for other people clearly places him in the masculine category. Karen
Kilcup says that transcendence “becomes questionable in its potential application to a
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feminine or other ‘non-mainstream’ writer, since the term presupposes a highly
individuated self that needs ‘transcending’” (7). This seems to be evident from the
poems above in which the persons—specifically the women, in the examples—are not
the real focus. Kilcup quotes Nancy Chodorow who describes “feminine selfhood [as
having] flexible or permeable ego-boundaries” (7). Having flexible and permeable
boundaries initially sounds like a characteristic of Wordsworth’s work, especially
referring back to Pottle’s description of the poet’s wavering and fading edges. However,
these edges are not “ego boundaries,” which are simply not flexible in Wordsworth. One
cannot walk through a Wordsworth poem without bumping into, tripping over, falling
into the poet himself. Kilcup says that “the notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ seem
inapplicable to a personality possessing… ‘flexible…ego boundaries’” (7), and as shown
above, concepts of interior versus exterior come up again and again in Wordsworth. The
extent of the poet’s ego boundaries is ad infinitum in his lines. Since his ego boundaries
are not flexible, there is a dearth of sympathy for other people in his lines, and such
sympathy is another quality Kilcup mentions that can categorize literature as feminine.
Dickstein also agrees that there is “little novelistic feeling for the inner lives of others” in
Wordsworth (260). Readers do not get to know Poor Susan because she is not,
essentially, a person; she is the poet’s objective correlative for loneliness.
In “The Solitary Reaper,” many of these claims are readily illustrated. The poet’s
initial idea for the poem comes from association. Hartman says, “It was on reading a
sentence in a friend’s manuscript…that the two-year-old memory of the solitary reaper
returned to him” (5). The poet’s source is not in nature observed before him in the
present. It is in memories—that come into his mind by association—“recollected in
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tranquility” (“Preface” 740). This space of time and physical distance—two kinds of
solitude in the poem—allow Wordsworth to recollect ideas and emotions in order to find
a deeper meaning in the mere physical experience. As the poet pictures the solitary
reaper in the poem, he sees her from the solitude of physical distance: “Behold her, single
in the field” (1). He keeps himself physically out of the field where she is, so they both
remain in solitude. He begins with a few descriptions of her—telling what she is doing
and noting that she is singing. However, he does not approach her or talk to her in order
to gain more information. He cannot; she speaks a different language. “Will no one tell
me what she sings?” the poet asks—another example of his obstinate questions (17). He
finds no satisfactory answers in the physical realm, so his presence, in philosophical
terms, begins to infuse her, to answer the questions, to provide the depth that he assumes
is there but cannot find by merely describing the physicality of the situation. He uses his
perhapses—his “prayers” for something deeper—to do so: “Perhaps the plaintive
numbers flow/ For old, unhappy, far-off things,/ And battles long ago” (18-20).
After reading the poem, a person does not feel he/she knows the “Highland Lass”
better. It is Wordsworth who is better known. As Hartman says, “When Wordworth
depicts an object he is also depicting himself or, rather, a truth about himself, a selfacquainted revelation” (5). It is, also, within the poet that the importance, the depth, of
this experience is retained: “And as I mounted up the hill,/ The music in my heart I bore,/
Long after it was heard no more” (30-32). The memory is sustained and deepened by the
poet, and it is maintained by him, carried on, perhaps, to associate later with other ideas.
These examples that deal with some of Wordsworth’s poetical practices suggest
that his poetry is best categorized as masculine, but a few details complicate this
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assessment. Kilcup says, “Another boundary that a feminine voice enables the poet to
elide is that of genre; and she or he may engage in a form of genre mixing that resists
easy classification” (8-9). The concept of a “lyrical ballad” is such a mixture of genre.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary a lyric is “used as the name for short poems
(whether or not intended to be sung)…[that] directly [express] the poet's own thoughts
and sentiments [and] engages the emotions.” A ballad, on the other hand, is more
traditionally associated with the narrative form. The Dictionary calls it a “simple spirited
poem in short stanzas…in which some popular story is graphically narrated.” This
practice of genre-mixing is something to which Wordsworth commits the majority of his
work. Kilcup also mentions the sentimental quality of literature that has traditionally
been classified as feminine. “Sentimental poetry” she says, “is the most obvious example
of [the] constructed affiliation between gender and genre” (9). Many of Wordsworth’s
poems can be classified as sentimental. He, in fact, labels an entire section of his poems
“Poems Founded on the Affections.” Poems in this section deal with unrequited love,
lovers who die, painful farewells, mothers and fathers who lose their children—to death
or to prodigality—and an idiot. These poems complicate the classification of
Wordsworth’s poetry as masculine.
As an aspect of the sentimental, Kilcup notes the ready “affiliation of women with
emotion” (9). This is the strongest characteristic I see that could shift, even if ever so
slightly, Wordsworth’s poetry in its gender classification. Alan Richardson also notes
that “in moving from an ‘Age of Reason’ to an ‘Age of Feeling,’ male [romantic] writers
drew on memories and fantasies of identification with the mother in order to colonize the
conventionally feminine domain of sensibility” (13). Wordsworth is adamant about the
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importance of emotion in poetry. In the “Preface” he writes “all good poetry is the
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,” and the following statement, his saying that
to create a good poem the poet must have “thought long and deeply,” does not undermine
his focus on emotion and feelings (735). For instance, he says later in the “Preface” “that
the feeling…gives importance to the action and situation, and not the action and situation
to the feeling” (735). The poet’s privileging of feelings over situations depends
essentially on the same philosophical core in Locke that keeps his focus on the
transcendent and not the physical. Though many critics, like Mahmoud Kharbutli,1 claim
it is Wordsworth’s insistence on thinking long and deeply that maintains his
philosophical association to Locke, it is actually his insistence that only modes—
feelings—can be known and not substance ideas—the ideas of physical things
themselves.
So, not only does noting Wordsworth’s privileging of emotions and feelings shift
the gender classification of his poetry, it also further establishes his philosophical
affiliation to Locke. Using Wordsworth as a bridge, could Locke be proven to write in
the feminine tradition? Perhaps, but that is not the intent of this study. My focus, rather,
is on Wordsworth and his poetical association and transcendence and, here, classifying
these practices in terms of gender. It could be said that, as Kilcup establishes,
transcendence is an essentially masculine literary practice. It seems that it is
Wordsworth’s associationism that constitutes the feminine side of his poetics. In fact,
Beatty quotes Samuel Rogers who describes “the associating principle[’s]…effects [as]
particularly striking in the domestic tribes” (178). Kilcup says, “concerns traditionally
1
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associated with women, including ‘domestic’ matters” classify literature as feminine (8).
Wordsworth does not focus, per se, on the domestic in his lines. In fact, in “To My
Sister,” we see the poet calling to her to leave the domestic sphere: “Make haste, your
morning task resign;/ Come forth and feel the sun” (11-12). This is so, however, because
the domestic is too quotidian—referring back to Mellor’s comment—for his concern.
Yet David Amigoni notes that a “cult of domesticity” does surround the poet. Amigoni
says that this affiliation is “exemplified in William Westall’s painting of 1840, Room at
Rydal Mount, in which Wordsworth stands in commanding but meditative pose against a
fireplace, whilst Mary is seated at a sofa, attending to domestic work at a table” (30).
The associating principle and the emotions that accompany it, I would argue, add to the
rise of this cult of domesticity around Wordsworth. These factors shift the classification
of his work in the feminine direction. In association, past ideas—from the poet’s
memory—are given credence by being associated onto the present physical scene, the
meaning of which they deepen. These ideas include emotions and feelings, which are
typically classified as feminine characteristics of literature. Abrams quotes John Stuart
Mill, who, in fact, delivers “to the feelings the total control over the associative process”
(178).
Wordsworth transcends the physical realm with his emotions guiding the
associations he makes. Each level of analysis on which this statement is founded
provides a striking and interestingly complicated contrast with the poetics of Frost, as the
next chapter will reveal. The objective behind Wordsworth’s forsaking of the physical is
not intentionally to ignore any other thing or person; it is rather to reveal more than, as he
225-237.
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sees it, could ever be revealed by staying “with” them—by dwelling on and relating their
mere physicality. In his lines, Wordsworth reaches for meaning and truth that are only
attainable by transcending the physical and by associating his own ideas with the present
physical reality before him. As in “Simon Lee” the poet spends some time describing the
old man—that he is “lean and he is sick; [and that his] body, dwindled and awry,/ Rests
upon ankles swoln and thick” (33-35)—, but ultimately the poet exhorts the reader that
there is something beyond the physical man of Simon Lee:
O Reader! Had you in your mind
Such stores as silent thought can bring,
O gentle Reader! You would find
A tale in everything. (65-68)
Simon Lee is important not because he is a physical being but because inherent in him is
a tale. And it is this “tale” behind the physical reality that Wordsworth seeks and seeks
for his reader to understand. This is the meaning; this is the importance.
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CHAPTER THREE:
ON FROST
There is mystery in the poetry of Wordsworth and Frost. As both poets transcend
the physical and leave the known, they experience the unknown. Wordsworth’s seemings
and perhapses indicate the unrevealed, the mysterious. The romantic poet often refers to
the “somethings” he encounters in nature, all indefinite things. Most of his mysteries
seem to glow in their ineffable qualities. They seem inherently good, and the reader
trusts the poet, just as the poet trusts nature, perhaps not to reveal all but to be smilingly
content in the mystery of nature, to enjoy the negative capability of the natural setting.
The benevolent mystery Wordsworth encounters is in nature itself and then is related in
the poet’s lines. Frost, on the other hand, as Lawrence Thompson notes, finds “mystery,
…wonder, …virtue, …[and] magic” in poetry, “its heterogeneity of elements somehow
blended to a single autonomous unit” (18). So rather than the ineffable mystery being
found in nature itself, Frost finds his mystery in poetry, even more specifically in the
making of poetry. This is what happens, as Richard Poirier says, interpreting Frost’s
poetry: we, as we read and “hear” from nature, are the ones who “make the most of it
[nature]” (162-165, emphasis Poirier’s). Frost finds in nature no “spontaneous wisdom,”
no ready-made knowledge, as Wordsworth does. The only “thing”—a clarifying
symbol— is what one makes. John F. Lynen notes this Frostian truth in “The Woodpile”;
Lynen says, “The only meaning one can find in nature is that imposed upon it by the
human mind” (145).
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Yet, in his poetics, Frost does not stop with a portrayal of a merely unresponsive
nature and an active poet. He goes further to focus on, much more than does
Wordsworth, “nature’s dark truths,” as Andrew Stambuk says (9). Lynen comments
accordingly on the “bleakness in [Frost’s] landscapes” (141). Though Wordsworth does
mention the fear that schooled him, this fear is more an awe of nature than a feeling that
suggests some nefarious force. When Frost looks at nature, however, he sees its darker
side and its dangerous chaos. Eric Carl Link notes this tendency in Frost as well; he says
the poet “question[s] at times the optimistic and comparatively monistic vision of
Emerson” (183), and one could add Wordsworth to this “monistic vision” category. Frost
uses an “ironic foregrounding of epistemological concerns” Link says, “[to] call into
question the romantic associationism of Emerson and other light romantics” (194), again,
like Wordsworth.
The paradox of Frost is that he does, as Stambuk notes, see nature
“emblematically” (3). This sounds like Wordsworth who uses nature, reading onto it
meaning by looking for and finding, through his associations, an objective correlative for
the emotions he experiences. However, Frost’s use of emblems and symbols for
discussing and describing natural things usually indicates the failure of these tropes to
express his ideas. William Doreski quotes Frost as saying, “All metaphor breaks down
somewhere…. That’s the beauty of it” (35). Frost’s tropes provide a stay against
confusion: they clarify and order the world for us. However, they do eventually break
down; they are all only momentary. The pools in “Spring Pools” could be illustrations of
Frost’s tropes. The pools reflect “The total sky almost without defect” (2), just as a
metaphor reflects something in an essential-izing (squeezing a great expanse into a small
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figure) and defect-less way. Yet nature ultimately empties the pools—the trees will
eventually “blot out and drink up and sweep away/ These flowery waters” (10-11)—just
as nature and natural/physical things ultimately empty all tropes of their power. Doreski
sees the failures of tropes and symbols in “After Apple-Picking” as well: he notes that
“the speaker’s sense [is] that the physical world has failed to embody itself in the
symbols his consciousness has attempted to possess” (42); I would, however, put the
emphasis of “failure” on the symbol. Though poets try to capture and picture nature in
their self-conceived figures of speech, these are all ultimately ineffectual in relating the
reality of natural and physical things.
Another illustration of failing tropes is evident in “The Door in the Dark.” Nature
is like the dark for Frost; he cannot “see” in it and cannot understand it fully: “In going
from room to room in the dark,/ I reached out blindly” (1-2). These movements are like
Frost’s attempts to put words around natural/physical things. He reaches out blindly with
metaphors and other figures of speech in order to try to create some order, some clarity,
shed some light on things. However, in his attempts to wrap words around other things,
he misses the physical things many times. In the poem, the poet says,
But [I] neglected, however lightly, to lace
My fingers and close my arms in an arc.
A slim door got in past my guard,
And hit me a blow in the head so hard
I had my native simile jarred. (3-7)
While the simile is jarred, the poet is “hit” (literally and figuratively) with reality—the
real, physical thing that escapes his attempts at containing it. “People and things don’t
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pair any more” (8); the poet does not know physical “things”; therefore he cannot contain
them, pair them up with matching words into language.
Frost’s (ultimately failing) emblems usually signify in two (or sometimes more)
directions. Link says, “Frost’s symbolism and metaphor tend not toward Emerson’s
revelatory union with Nature, but tend toward multiple interpretation, indirection, and
ambiguity” (183-184). The poet’s emblems can suggest, by going deeper into association
and into the self (of the one who associates), possible meanings of things which are not
physically present, or they can simply be pictures of the physical things. The choice of
which to “read” is really the readers’. Jonathan N. Barron suggests this is the case in
Frost’s “The Black Cottage.” Barron notes that in Frost’s poem, the appearance of the
bees at the end could be interpreted from “the literary perspective…[as] the bees tell[ing]
us that nature will offer no solace,” or it could be interpreted “from the naturalist’s
perspective, [in that] the bees are merely doing what bees do” (140-141). This multiple
perspective in Frost’s lines leaves his poems (perhaps) more open to interpretation than
Wordsworth’s. Priscilla Paton notes that in a Wordsworthian poem one usually
encounters the poet’s “superiority of imagination that enables him to partake of the
landscape’s pleasures” (90). In Frost, the poetic superiority is much more limited.
Though the poet is the one who can transgress boundaries—as in “Good Hours”—and
can, “if he is lucky,” as George W. Nitchie says, quoting Frost, produce “ ‘a clarification
of life…a momentary stay against confusion’ ” (166), Frost does not ultimately claim that
he knows more about the natural setting than does the common (wo)man. In fact, in his
poetry he seems to question (playfully at times) whether there even are deeper universal
truths in physical things. Frank Lentricchia notes that “we reveal the world… as we
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desire to see it revealed” (6-7). What Frost reveals in his poems is his own personal
association or revelation, not necessarily the one that anyone else would achieve if
exposed to the same physical stimuli.
In considering Frost’s emblems and his similarities and differences with
Wordsworth, one would also note Frost’s dealings with the rural, poor people in his lines
and, as Karen L. Kilcup1 deals with, his portrayal of women. Wordsworth uses the rural
poor to reveal deeper ideas; he transcends them (the physical beings), following his
associated ideas to reach a subliminal, philosophic level. Wordsworth mentions these
people and women but ultimately leaves them as mere ideas, not flesh and bone beings.
Frost, on the other hand, stays with them. That is, they stay people in his lines; they are
not left to be merely ideas, objective correlatives of the poet’s “deep thoughts.” The
woman in “The Witch of Coös,” for example, is ultimately not just an idea. She is a
person and a most physical being at that, one who speaks in words worth listening to.
Kilcup says Frost “combat[s] idealization of [the women in his lines and that
he]…provide[s] them with recognizable identit[ies]” (67). The witch of Coös is certainly
a recognizable, remarkable, and memorable individual. Frost’s portrayal of her is
anything but one of higher ideals and transcendent realities; it is about her—the person,
the woman.
Further, though Frost does “read meaning in natural objects” (Stambuk 9), as does
Wordsworth, Frost’s associated ideas are more ephemeral and less important than
Wordsworth’s. Frost’s poems do not stop with them: they are not the inherent answer
11

I do not agree with all Kilcup says of Frost and his portrayal of women, however. She says Frost
“relinquish[es] his own identity as an autonomous male poet [in order to enter]…into the psyches of these
women” (67). This sounds too much like what I argue Frost wants to avoid—losing himself in anything.
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behind his poems. Though at times Frost epistemologically wanders in his lines and
enjoys associating ideas, he cannot and will not completely avoid the physical. In this
refusal to avoid the physical, Frost also refuses to ignore or cover over the scariness he
sees in natural things. For instance, Paton explains Frost’s veering away from romantic
sublimity into a darker view of nature in “The Mountain”: “The scene inspires neither the
sublimity of inexplicable forces nor expanded human vision and control. The mountain’s
power is most negative: it ‘held the town as in a shadow’” (91). In “Bereft” as well, one
can see Frost’s view of a more menacing nature; in this poem the “Leaves got up in a coil
and hissed [and],/ Blindly struck at [the poet’s] knee” (9-10). Additionally, in “Storm
Fear,” Frost thinks of times “When the wind works against us in the dark” (1). The
image Frost has of nature is not a glowing one of a benevolent thing.
Stambuk also gives the example of “Design,” which, he notes, “centers on the
image of a spider entangling its prey as suggestive of nature’s malevolence” (10). The
natural scene Frost pictures in this sonnet is one of “death and blight” (4): “I found a
dimpled spider, fat and white,/ On a white heal-all, holding up a moth/ Like a white
piece of rigid satin cloth” (1-3). The poet likens these characters to “ingredients of a
witches’ broth” (6), which calls into question the idea of a benevolent “designer.” He
seems to suggest that perhaps we—all natural beings—are aberrant ingredients in a
witch-designer’s broth. Frost questions the source of these freaks of nature—a white
heal-all, which should be blue; a white dimpled spider. “What but design of darkness to
appall?” (13) is the uncertain conclusion the poet reaches, and his uncertainty is shrouded
in darkness. These dark realizations Frost makes about nature and his physical
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surroundings leave many more of his poems darkly unresolved—in contrast to the
sublime (and even glowing) epistemological elevation Wordsworth achieves in many of
his lines.
Frost seems, then, to undermine more than elevate (and many critics note Frost’s
frequent use of irony to undermine romantic associations in order to suggest a darker
conclusion). This lack of glowing resolutions hinges on the fact that, as Link states, Frost
“express[es] a certain skepticism concerning the ability of the poet to reconcile man and
Nature, or the subject and the object” (183). (For Frost “Nature” includes natural things
and also other people.) Frost cannot completely reconcile man and nature because he
does not fully know nature and, therefore, cannot appropriate natural things to himself
and his experience. In “Two Tramps in Mud Time” Frost illustrates the “unknowability”
of nature by using the example of the weather. The poet says, “You know how it is with
an April day” (18), but the point is actually that you have no idea how it will be with an
April day. You cannot know. One minute “the sun is out and the wind is still…But if
you so much as dare to speak,/ A cloud comes over the sunlit arch, [and]/ A wind comes
off a frozen peak” (lines 19,21-22). Any logical attempt to know, in this case, April, in a
larger sense, nature and natural things and express it in words is futile, and the speaker
immediately gets proven wrong.
Frost notes as well the tendency in people to allow their minds to dance away into
romantic associations instead of accepting that they cannot really know nature and
physical things. In “On the Heart Beginning to Cloud the Mind,” Frost relates his own
struggles with this temptation: “Something I saw or thought I saw/ In the desert at
midnight in Utah” (1-2). One could think, if it were not for the stuttering hesitancy in the
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first line, that this line was in one of Wordsworth’s poems. The “something” sings of a
mere suggestion, an indefinite “thing” that longs (or so it seems initially) to be named by
the poet. Frost then begins to play, falling into an imaginative association:
The earth had a single light afar,
A flickering, human pathetic light,
That was maintained against the night,
It seemed to me, by the people there,
With a God-forsaken brute despair. (6-10)
The “something” lulls the poet into a seeming, a naming, a guessing. He colors his words
and imaginatively decorates them: “It would flutter and fall in half an hour/ Like the last
petal off a flower” (11-12). Then, though, he stops his associations and starts with the
truth, turning toward reality:
But my heart was beginning to cloud my mind.
I knew a tale of a better kind.
That far light flickers because of trees.
The people can burn it as long as they please:
And when their interests in it end,
They can leave it to someone else to tend. (13-18)
He loses patience with his heart’s play, which he has allowed to cloud his mind. Frost is
honest about the tendency of the poet to fall into attempted transcendence of the physical,
to spin attractive tales with similes and associated ideas. The light in the poem is like the
poet’s figure of speech: it burns as long as he will let it, and then he can leave it for
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someone else to try to use and build on. Yet the poet is adamant about his preference for
truth—the real thing—and reality (which I will deal with at greater length below).
Such practices of associating ideas and transcending the physical landscape,
according to Frost, do not help the poet to reveal nature (or the ideas behind it). In most
of his poems, Frost refuses to assert himself and his own ideas onto the natural things and
physical beings he pictures in his lines, like Baptiste, the birch trees, and even the white
heal-all. Though they are enjoyable at times, his associated ideas fall short in reaching,
epistemologically speaking, the physical things around him because the physical things
are different, other, and foreign. This is a (William) Jamesian concept of the “other” as
separate and very different from oneself. James, as Lentricchia notes, accepted “the
skeptical and common sense view of the world of objects as indeed ‘out there,’ as hard,
dense and often dangerous” (8). From this philosophy comes Frost’s own, and Doreski
sees it at work in Frost’s “The Wood-Pile”; he says it “is a poem about…the limitations
of the most obvious attempts to reconcile nature and the mind” (39). It is in Frost’s dark
view of nature that the danger James sees in “other” things is expressed. And seeing
other things as hard and dense means that the only way there will be a merger between
looker and object is if the looker changes form. Frost is unwilling to liquefy (to lose his
physical form) in order to fuse himself into other things, in order to reconcile himself to
them.
The poem “The Thatch” deals with this concept of inside and outside, the poet
and his subject(s). In the poem, which pictures what could be one of Thoreau’s Waldenesque scenes, the poet notices that some birds are “living in hermitage” in his thatch roof
(16). The poet wants a connection with nature; he would like for the birds to be able to
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live there with him, it seems. “It grieve[s] [his] soul” (20) to have to throw the “birds out
of hole after hole” (19) that they have made in his thatch roof. However, if the birds were
left there to nest, they would destroy the thatch. The “hole after hole” that they have
made in the thatch would grow until there would be nothing left of the man-made roof,
and the thatch is the man’s own protection against the “winter rain” (1) and shield from
the world which is “a black invisible field” (10). Permitting things to come “in” that
should be kept “out” is dangerous, and this is confirmed in the end of the poem:
They tell me the cottage where we dwelt,
Its wind-torn thatch goes now unmended;
Its life of hundreds of years has ended
By letting the rain I knew outdoors
In on to the upper chamber floors. (31-35)
Nature is dangerous, and if allowed to enter inside (inside a home or inside a person), the
result is disastrous. Ruin will be the result (of the home or of the person).
Informing Frost’s opinion that he cannot ultimately know nature and natural
things is his distrust of nature. Aware of its darker sides and the chaos that exists in
nature, he does not want to lose himself in it or in associations about it because he is
unsure whether, in such confusion, he could ever find himself again. As Lewis Klausner
notes, “Frost is less inclined than Wordsworth to privilege Nature as a repository of the
human soul” (137). Though Wordsworth practically swims in the sublimity of nature,
Frost refrains. He refuses philosophically to plunge himself (and his soul) into nature.
Just as Doctor Magoon in “A Hundred Collars” is very suspicious of Lafe’s advice to
“Lie down—let yourself go and get some sleep” (162), so is the poet apprehensive about
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letting himself go into nature. Judith Oster notes Frost’s desire to be “inviolate as an
entity that only he possessed” (18). This hesitancy to give himself over to nature (and
other natural things he describes in his lines) becomes almost like a religious or
philosophical reverence for nature. Link quotes Roberts French as saying that “reading
through [Frost’s] works, one finds that a major tone involves feelings of profound
uneasiness, even of fear toward nature” (184). If fear is a type of reverence, then the
religious parallel works. Frost sees nature as too different—to a nearly holy extent—to
be fully appropriated. For Frost physical things are to be respected; one cannot totally
leave them or expect any kind of understanding to be achieved. The natural setting thus
provides an almost religious-like common experience for people in that it is the basis for
the only commonality that can be expected between people and things (specifically Frost
and his readers). For Frost the physical is the place where any successful communication
must begin (and end).
The physical setting is also the only place Frost could ever hope to construct a
stay against the confusion that does naturally exist. The confusion that Frost is warring
against, as I see it, is the disharmony between the inner self and exterior things. He sees
the inconsistencies between the two. Therefore, he presents both, balancing them against
each other to produce a kind of settled stay against confusion. In “Birches” Frost
digresses into romantic association. He says he does “like to think some boy’s been
swinging” on the bent birch trees (3), and Oster notes that some of the details are “highly
associative and figurative” (60). In “A Romantic Chasm,” Frost notes, “In the beginning
was the word, to be sure, very sure, and a solid basic comfort it remains in situ, but the
fun only begins with the spirited when you treat the word as a point of many departures”
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(804). Frost enjoyed the departures from the solid, physical world. However, nearly
simultaneously, there is a “devaluation of [such] extraneousness,” as J. H. Van den Berg
explains, in order to avoid a “loss of understanding” (60). Wordsworth, also, devalues
extraneousness, but his movements are exactly opposite of Frost’s. Frost omits romantic
associations and stays on earth with the physical things in order not to lose
understanding; Wordsworth omits the differences and individuality among the subjects of
his lines in order to unify and find the one collective meaning of the natural thing/scene.
As in “Birches,” Frost returns to earth: “But swinging doesn’t bend them down to stay/
As ice-storms do” (4-5). The poet returns to earth and to the truth. Fun is one thing, but
truth is certainly something else, something only to be found, according to Frost, on
earth. Link sees this kind of movement in the poem: “there is an Extra-vagant ascent into
Nature, and a subsequent return to earth, a going-forth and a coming-back, an expansion
and recoil” (188). The recoil brings the poet back, lands him on the physical. One can
also see this type of movement—out and then back—in “A Late Walk.” The poet notes
upon his return from the walk, “I end not far from my going forth” (13).
The movements out and in take place as well in “Going for Water.” Here one can
see the pull to the imaginative and then back to reality and the physical landscape. Some
children (one might assume) are going for water because the well is dry. This could be
read as meaning that the physical landscape is no longer stimulating, and so they must go
into the woods and (later) into their imaginations to quench their thirst for adventure.
The characters do head into the woods:
But once within the wood, we paused
Like gnomes that hid us from the moon,
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Ready to run to hiding new
With laughter…. (13-16)
The natural setting is the initial inspiration for the imagination. It is only when they get
into the woods that they feel that they are out of sight and can imagine themselves as
some other things/persons and begin to run and play. However, as in most of Frost’s
poems, there is a pull back to the physical setting. They are not gnomes; they are real
people going for water, and it is the sound of the brook that arouses again this sense of
reality in them. The imaginative associations stop:
Each laid on other a staying hand
To listen ere we dared to look,
And in the hush we joined to make
We heard, we knew we heard the brook. (17-20)
For the characters of the poem and even the poet himself, rather than flying away into
imagination, rather than transcending (and forgetting about) the physical setting, are
pulled back to it, back to duty, back into real life.
In “Birches,” one can clearly see the poet himself coming back to earth. He says,
“I’d like to get away from earth awhile/ And then come back to it and begin over” (4849). He comes back, as I see it, to achieve understanding. If he continues as a vector all
the way into “heaven” (instead of just “toward” it, as in the poem), he would lose his
reader at some point, and the understanding—the pact—between them would be
destroyed. In “Revelation,” Frost explains how dealing in the literal is much more
conducive to achieving understanding:
We make ourselves a place apart
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Behind light words that tease and flout…
‘Tis pity if the case require
(Or so we say) that in the end
We speak the literal to inspire
The understanding of a friend. (1-2, 5-8)
Yet the poet is saying it is most definitely not a pity; it is, instead, a fact, that one must
deal in the literal—the physical thing, one might say—in order to inspire the
“understanding” of any person. Frost mentions people who would hide themselves
(behind figurative language, for example):
But so with all, from babes that play
At hide-and-seek to God afar,
So all who hide too well away
Must speak and tell us where they are. (9-12)
If anyone, from a babe to God, is trying to reveal something, he/she must speak literally.
They must “speak and tell us where they are,” give us a physical setting in which to meet
them. The literal, physical thing provides the place for the stay against the confusion that
exists in the figurative “light words,” in the imagined heavenly realm.
Van den Berg says “we will not and we cannot do without objects as means of
understanding” (60). Though we know that, in “Birches,” Frost admits he does “prefer”
the tale of the boy, the romantic (and personal, because the boy is associated with
himself) association, he must base this association in the physical—on the bent birch tree
bowing before him—or else there will be a loss of understanding. The physical thing
does bind the poet at times; it keeps him from sailing away completely into what he
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“prefers.” This is illustrated well in “Lodged,” where the poet empathizes with the
flowers that “lay lodged—though not dead” (5) after the rain and wind push them down.
“I know how the flowers felt,” he says (6), because the poet understands how nature does
keep him from blooming into beautiful romantic associations at times. However, it is
ultimately more than necessary to stick with the physical thing (nature) in order to
achieve understanding. The physical setting supports Frost as he develops ideas and tries
to relate them to his readers.
Beyond just acknowledging this necessity to stay on earth in order to effect
successful understanding, Frost celebrates being here. Earth is a good place. In “A
Prayer for Spring,” Frost beseeches, “keep us here/ All simply in the springing of the
year” (3-4). The poem focuses on a kind of carpe diem attitude (“Oh, give us pleasure in
the flowers today” [1]) but even more on an overall appreciation of earth. The poet longs
to continue to enjoy the present—the present time, yes, but also the present place, earth:
“Oh, gives us pleasure in the orchard white…And make us happy in the happy bees” (5,
7). He affirms, “For this is love and nothing else is love” (13). Love, for Frost, is not
melting into something imagined. For him, love is loving what is on earth, what is seen
and can be touched, heard, tasted, and smelled.
The physical “thing” that is the common experience for Frost and his readers is
what he builds on to achieve understanding. Poirier quotes Wallace Stevens, who notes
just this; Stevens says, “Your trouble, Robert, is that you write poems about—things”
(150). Frost must write about things in order to attempt any communication. This is in
contrast with Wordsworth, in whose poetry the emotion that results from seeing/hearing
the physical thing is presented as the common experience. M. H. Abrams quotes
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Wordsworth as saying that “the materials of a poem come from within and they consist
expressly neither of objects nor actions, but of the fluid feelings of the poet himself” (47).
For Frost the materials of a poem are physical objects. Frost’s practices are Lockean in
this respect because, as Lentricchia says, all his landscapes are “congruent with patterns
of experience” (18). The poet’s feelings may flow toward the physical things—through
association of ideas—but the truth is that any common understanding that is to be reached
as a result of a poem must be built on the physical. Paton says, “ ‘The Mountain’
…repress[es] romantic impulses in the name of practicality and dour habit” (90). The
strength of practicality and, more importantly, physicality holds up Frost’s work.
Instead of reaching for a sublime revelation, Frost privileges the practical and the
physical, especially in his search for truth. Truth is key when considering the motive of
Frost in his poetry. Poirier (287-289) sees him addressing this in “Mowing,” in which
work he says, “Anything more than truth would have seemed too weak” (9). Frost wants
to reach a kind of understanding (but not a closed kind) in his lines, but what is
understanding worth if it is not insight into something true? Frost searches for or, rather,
illustrates the universal search for truth. He tells his readers, as Lentricchia says, that
“the real thing…is often to be preferred to what we make in the imagination” (xii). Peter
D. Poland mentions Frost’s interest in truth as it is revealed in “Neither Out Far nor In
Deep.” Poland writes that “The poem is very much ‘about’ this search for truth” (95).
This search for truth, especially as it is portrayed in this poem, also, depends upon Frost’s
refusal to leave the earth, to go out far or in deep. Poland says this of the people in the
poem: “Turning their backs on the land world, their world, [the people in the poem] have
violated their promises; they are asleep to their human responsibilities” (96). Frost
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continually asserts that a search for any truth will not be found by abandoning the earth—
the natural world. In “Birches,” Frost asserts that “Earth is the right place for love” (52),
upholding the value of earth in any search for depth. In “Bond and Free,” Frost writes,
“Love has earth to which she clings” (1). If love is the deep experience to be sought,
earth is the place for the seeking. All the beauty that Thought—one could say,
transcendent thought—“fares [so] far/ To find” (15-16) exists here on earth. And Love,
by “simply staying [on earth] possess[es] all” (15). To Frost it is important to live on
earth—to love, to act, to interact. These actions taken in this physical setting are what
satisfy any search for depth of philosophical experience. Frost would likely say that
Wordsworth goes out too far and in too deep in his search for meaning; he misses the
immediate.
Link says of Frost’s truth-searching tendency that “The key to Extra-vagance is
the attempt on the part of the poet to journey beyond conventional boundaries in an
attempt to uncover hidden truth. It is both a literal wondering and a figurative questing”
(184). This is a journey to reconcile one with the world, to find something in nature that
resonates with the journeyer. Truth would be that reconciliation. For Wordsworth the
reconciliation comes in the form of association. As something in the natural things he
comes into contact with stirs a corresponding breeze within the poet, his ideas begin to
associate, and he arrives—reconciling nature and man. However, as Link notes, “the
quest beyond Nature [in Frost] results in an epistemological ‘crisis of belief’ and
ultimately fails” (185). The poet/journeyer is too different; nature and natural things are
too different. Association for Frost is like an attempt to bridge the epistemological gap,
but even in the launching of this attempt, he quietly asserts the futility of it. The
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associations are meager attempts, like an American throwing rocks in the ocean to build a
bridge to England. It can be fun; one likes to dream about the grand result, and the
thrower can see the results of her attempts—the ripples around the place where the rock
is swallowed by the water. But dreaming is all that comes of the attempts, and as she
leaves, there is nothing left on the natural scene to indicate to the next visitor that she’s
ever been there.
This idea that nature is completely unaffected by our philosophical spinning about
it is illustrated well in “On Going Unnoticed.” In the poem, the person who is in the
woods is “engaged up there with the light and breeze” (4) totally unaware of his/her
physical surroundings. Not physically alert (though likely philosophically very aware),
the person is transcending the physical. He/she is not appreciating the leaves and trees,
the birds’ songs and the smells; he/she is above, hovering beyond the physical. Frost
expresses his opinion of such a posture through his description of the person: the person
is “in the shadow of trees” and “Less than the coral-root” (3, 5); he/she looks up “small
from the forest’s feet” (10, emphasis added) and “linger[s] [his/her] little hour and [is]
gone” (13, emphasis added). Though the person looks above and likely thinks in “deep”
ideas, he/she is still “gone” by the end of the poem:
And still the woods sweep leafily on,
Not even missing the coral-root flower
You took as a trophy of the hour. (14-16)
There is no appreciation of the physical in this person; he/she merely wants a trophy from
nature, not to remind him/her of nature itself but of the transcendent experience he/she
had in the woods. Nature, however, does not and will not remember. The event is
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inconsequential to it, and except for the small flower taken by the human, the natural
setting is unchanged by his/her visit there.
In this physical setting, Frost maintains a close physical proximity with the
physical things with which he comes into contact. Oster notes that Frost “was not
content, or perhaps not able, to remain at the comfortable distance provided by analogy”
(10). Frost does not stand back and use figurative language just to compare. He enters
the poems: he talks to Baptiste, the Witch of Coös, his neighbor in “Mending Wall”; he
invites the “you” in “The Pasture” to come with him. Frost “maintains a constant
dialectic…with the Other of feeling and perception” (79), Oster says; as I see it, the poet
essentially maintains a dialectic with the “Other.” He talks, interacts, enters the homes
of, touches the other things, beings, natural objects in his lines. In “A Dream Pang,” the
poet assures the “you” of the poem, “Not far, but near, I stood and saw it all” (9).
The close physical proximity Frost maintains with natural things is tempered by
his simultaneously maintaining philosophical solitude, a stance that is the opposite of
Wordsworth’s. This stance of Frost’s is clearly illustrated in “Mending Wall,” in which
work the poet remains just across the wall from his neighbor but most philosophically
separate. The poet asks his neighbor why they must continually rebuild the wall; “He
only says, ‘Good fences make good neighbors’” (27). Though the poet is complicit in the
building activity, he is of a completely different mindset: “Spring is the mischief in me,
and I wonder” (and here comes the philosophical wandering to try to meet and connect)
“If I could put a notion in his head: ‘Why do they make good neighbors?’” (28-30). Yet,
in the end, he does not put his own notion into his neighbor’s head: “I could [share my
ideas with] him/ But…I’d rather/ He said it for himself” (36-38); so they remain
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philosophically separate. This separation is confirmed when the poet notes that as they
continue the rebuilding, his neighbor “moves in darkness, as it seems to me” (41). This
darkness is “not of woods only, and the shade of trees” (42, emphasis added); it is also
philosophical darkness: they are separate, and the poet does not completely understand
his neighbor’s motives (ultimately) because he is not his neighbor. One can see that Frost
builds so much on the physical—his only place to achieve understanding—because there
is no common philosophical ground for him; he dwells in philosophical solitude. He
does not give himself over to philosophically melting into anything (or anyone) else.
Poirier argues that “Stopping by Woods” “is about…the enchantments that invite
us to surrender ourselves to oblivion” (7). However, Frost does not surrender; instead, he
resumes his life on earth, remembering and returning to keep his promises. “The poet
resists the attraction of losing himself and being swept into oblivion,” Stambuk says of
Frost. This is in sharp contrast to Wordsworth who gives himself fully to nature—or, one
could say, totally appropriates the nature that surrounds him, absorbing all into himself.
Doreski, in discussing “After Apple-Picking,” notes, “One can conceive of someone
foolish enough to take all landscapes, allegorical or otherwise, as personal to
himself…[but such a] Wordsworthian stance is not Frost’s” (37). Frost continually
resists such a move, and his resistance is indicative of his posture towards nature. There
is always a tug back toward the physical. He can never completely transcend the natural
setting—people, places, things. Though Frost slips into association (that is, into himself),
and out, out, toward oblivion, he is never quite swept away, never enraptured. He
returns, like a boomerang, to the place of launching, the physical setting. Stambuk sees
Frost’s boomerang-ish philosophical movements in “Stopping by Woods.” Frost
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ultimately “doggedly asserts,” the critic says, “that he must get on with living” (14). And
“living” for Frost is done on earth.
Frost “proudly insists,” notes Barron, “on the lack of transcendent aims in his
work” in contrast to those found in Wordsworth (149). In the end, Wordsworth’s finales
are sublimely deep assertions whereas Frost’s are anti-climactic sighs. The sighs are
breaths that leave space for his readers to write their own meanings onto the natural
scene. As Klausner says of Frost’s “To an Ancient,” “The poem is not a final marker or a
monument, but a blank space that we, Frost’s readers, must fill with our own powers of
faith, skepticism, and discernment” (see footnote p. 10). The readers may allow their
minds to associate ideas with birch trees, spring pools, cow pastures, associated ideas that
take them away. Or, they may decide to stay on the physical scene, as does Frost for the
most part, to appreciate the look of the branches or the flowers beside spring pools. Frost
presents both possibilities in order to give his readers the chance to make their own
decisions. He cuts through the chaos of the world to present these two paths amidst the
woods of confusion. The reader has her choice of which to take. As Frost says in “At
Woodward’s Gardens,” “It’s knowing what to do with things that counts” (37). And
Frost likes to stay physically close to his “things.” He listens to the people, picks the
flowers, visits his neighbors, goes for water, goes for a walk—always on earth, or else he
lands here again after a short stint in the stars.
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CONCLUSION
Jonathan N. Barron in his essay “A Tale of Two Cottages: Frost and Wordsworth”
says that despite the fact that “since he published his first book, critics have read Robert
Frost’s poetry in light of Wordsworth’s,…the connection between the two poets still
lacks a sustained, extended critical examination” (132). Barron attributes this to “a lack
of critical attention to Frost’s own intellectual, cultural, and literary allusions” (132). In
this study, I have tried to articulate more fully many of the similarities and differences
between the two poets; instead of looking at allusions, however, I have found the best
way to compare and contrast their work is to look at the philosophical traditions in which
they wrote.
Locke, Hartley and James provide the philosophical terms that are necessary to
deal with the crux of the comparison between the two poets. I see the crux of this
comparison as being contained in the poets’ respective answers to the questions of what
is important and what clarifies existence. I see both poets struggling to answer these
questions as they look at the physical things around them. In their lines they ask, where
does one look for the importance and meaning in physical things? Are humans important
in reference to nature? Is there something in humans—an inherent quality—that connects
us with nature and other natural things? Is there something in nature that will clarify
human relationships with it? Is such a connection necessary/important in order to justify
our existence and the space we share with nature and other physical things on earth, and
would a connection clarify the confusion that otherwise exists among us?
For Wordsworth there is something to be found in nature and within the poet that
will clarify the relationship between and connect the two. In “Lines Composed a Few
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Miles above Tintern Abbey,” the poet describes nature revealing and him finding
meaning. He says these “beauteous forms” of nature have inspired in him “tranquil
restoration” (21, 30):
[Yet, to] them I may have owed another gift,
Of aspect more sublime…
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things. (36-37, 47-49)
In nature exists a deeper “life of things,” and it is the harmony that exists between nature
and the poet that enables him to see this deeper life. Wordsworth trusts nature to reveal
itself, its deeper meaning—as he notes in this poem, “Nor less, I trust…them,” that is,
these forms of nature (36). There is a corresponding wind in nature and in the poet that
connects the two, that makes the harmony between them. There are live embers within
the poet that nature can recognize and remember. And this recognition and connection
are important above all else. They not only bridge the gap between the physical things
and the poet; they also unify the poet and other people—giving Wordsworth the
connection he needs with Poor Susan and the solitary reaper to find meaning within them.
This connection allows the poet to speak wisely about other things. His wisdom, even, is
spontaneous and found in nature: it is waiting for him, to be discovered by him, to help
him reach and understand the inherent and transcendent meaning in the things he sees.
Frost, on the other hand, has trouble accepting the idea of something pre-existing,
active and acting, in nature—something that would clarify all—and in any kind of
connection that one might assume exists between humans and physical things/nature. In
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“Afterflakes” the poet, during “the thick of a teeming snowfall” (1), is looking in nature
at the snow and “up at the sky” (3) for the answer to “why” (4). However, in the final
stanza he
…turned and looked back upward.
The whole sky was blue;
And the thick flakes floating at a pause
Were but frost knots on airy gauze,
With the sun shining through. (11-15)
The thick snowstorm at the beginning of the poem abruptly changes into a light snowfall
by the end. The poet, who was looking in the first stanza for an answer, a revelation,
receives none. In fact, before he can even fully articulate a question—he says vaguely in
the first stanza that he just “looked back up at the sky” (4)—the snowstorm is over. No
reason given, no meaning understood. Nature abruptly changes, period. The shadow of
the storm is indeed “shapeless” (9), and the only “form” (8) one can get out of nature is
what he/she can make, and the only meaning one can gain is what he/she can interpret
from his/her own making. In stanza two, the poet casts his shadow, and this gives form
to the scene, but this form reveals meaning only about the poet: “the shadow of mine
should show in form/ Against the shapeless shadow of storm,/ How swarthy I must be”
(8-10). No universal truth is revealed by nature. The poet does not reveal any deep
meaning of the natural scene; he ends, instead, with a physical description of it, and the
flakes remain “but frost knots on an airy gauze.”
For Frost, there could be something left in nature; he does not completely close
that door. Yet, he is skeptical above all else that he, or anyone else, could find it—a
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thing, a commonality, a connection that would bridge the gap between humans and nature
and between (wo)man and (wo)man, something that would eliminate the confusion. This
doubt does not, however, render him speechless and useless; he does not throw his hands
in the air and lament his own lack of power to speak about nature. This is articulated in
the poem “In a Time of Cloud Burst” in which he concedes man’s condition as repetitive
but hopes that he won’t grow bitter about it:
May my application so close
To so endless a repetition
Not make me tired and morose
And resentful of man’s condition. (25-28)
And it seems in his other poems that he does not become tired and morose and resentful.
Instead, Frost the poet makes himself at home on earth. He gets as close as he can to
other things and people—physically close, as I show in earlier chapters—without
assuming, however, that he will achieve a spiritual connection with them, and this keeps
him philosophically separate. Instead of bemoaning what he does not find, he makes
what he can, as he sees it, of what he has. And the making is the poet’s, the person’s. He
makes clarity; he helps nature along, so to speak, with his own interpretation, associating
his own ideas to make his own provisional meanings at times while enjoying the natural
setting.
For Wordsworth, associated ideas are “natural”: the spark for them is found in
nature. They are (nearly) obvious, at least to the poet, who has a heightened sense of
things. As Wordsworth says in the “Preface,” a poet “is a man…endowed with more
lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of
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human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among
mankind” (737). When the poet looks at—from his physical distance—some other thing,
he can follow his associated ideas, ultimately, because he trusts nature. And nature is
trustworthy. He can trust it because it will bless him and reveal itself to him. As the poet
says in the first book of The Prelude, “Oh there is blessing in this gentle breeze” (1).
Since he has an inherent connection with nature—shares a “correspondent breeze” with it
(Book One, The Prelude 35)—and because he has a “comprehensive soul,” following his
own ideas is just allowing himself to be led by nature. Nature wants him, as Wordsworth
imagines it, to see, for example, the pet lamb as his soul. For Wordsworth, in order to
see—and the word is used loosely here—what is important and in order to articulate the
meaning that clarifies existence and that (already) exists in nature, one must have this
connection with nature, and to have that, one must be a poet.
Frost’s opinion on such a statement is complicated. One could immediately say
Frost would emphatically disagree with all aspects of it and could probably supply
justification for such an answer. However, in his search for meaning, Frost does find
things of value on earth; though not a corresponding breeze between himself and nature,
he does find some clarification of existence. This occurs in the making of a poem and
more specifically, in his metaphors. Further, since a poet makes metaphors, one might
say that Frost does agree with Wordsworth on at least this aspect of the role of poet.
Frost would say that the poet does give clarity—the momentary stay against confusion,
but Frost would not agree that the poet is endowed with heightened sensibility in
comparison to other people. Another divergence of their opinions is that for Wordsworth
the clarity and meaning already exist in nature, and they are just found by the poet,
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revealed by nature; for Frost they must be made by the poet—and remade again and
again because they are temporary.
For Wordsworth being a poet is (maybe) just one step below being divine, but for
Frost the role is not a divine one. The poet, it would seem from reading the “Preface,” is
chosen before birth to be a seer, a knower, an interpreter. He is “endowed” with gifts that
help him find the importance and meaning in things and relate them in order to clarify for
others the meaning of existence. The poet is different—having more gifts “than are
supposed to be common among mankind”—and is nearly holy in his elevated role. In the
chapter on Wordsworth, I elaborate on “The Poet’s Dream” as an example of the poet
becoming god-like at times. In Wordsworth’s separateness and in his special insight, he
approaches divinity.
With this aspect of the role of poet, much more than with the first—involving the
poet’s connections to nature—Frost would argue. In his doubt and skepticism, Frost,
though he does not completely eliminate the possibility of a divinity, does not assume
that he himself is divine. Holiness, a characteristic of divinity, is something for which he
never aims. He likes being on earth, visiting Baptiste, talking to friends, climbing trees.
Ironically, in his poetry Frost is the “maker”—the one who gives order. It would seem
that Frost might say, in a rather indifferent tone, perhaps that “maker” is the only one we
can expect here, not one who creates from scratch the physical things that exist, just one
who puts them in order so that we can “make ourselves” understand. In “Directive,” the
poet tells the reader, “Make yourself up a cheering song of how/ Someone’s road home
from work this once was,/ Who may be just ahead of you on foot” (29-31). The reader,
too, is capable of “making,” and the syntax suggests that in the making we are “making
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[ourselves] up” as well as any cheering song we create to give order to our existence. In
his poems, Frost is making his own order, and we can, of course, take up his in addition
to making our own, just as a neighbor borrows some butter to make his/her own cake.
To make his order, Frost uses metaphors, and he enjoys doing so. He plays with
them all the time. However, the metaphors are always momentarily effective in their
clarifying ability. I see this resulting from the fact that Frost is, above all, faithful to the
earth and to the reality he knows here; he finds truth here and does not forsake that truth
or earth in his own art. Earth is changeable—things live and die every day. Mimicking
this earthly reality, Frost’s metaphors—his steps toward creating his own little world of
order from chaos—likewise cannot ultimately withstand, without changing, the test of
time and the power of the natural things that the metaphors strive to contain. The
metaphors fail, they crumble, they fall. Like all earthly things, which Frost felt such
allegiance to, he based his own little worlds of metaphors on the earthly cycle of being
and dying, functioning and decaying, providing order and losing it, falling into chaos
again.
Wordsworth’s metaphors, too, are clarifying symbols. Though they might appear
to be, to the less “endowed” individual, the making of order from chaos, they are really
just order and meaning revealed, not created. These metaphors reveal the poet’s
tendency to unify all things in his associative process. And Wordsworth’s metaphors,
unlike Frost’s, shine with divinity, with eternal-ness. They provide insight into the
meaning of things and are to be praised, worshipped, and understood as clarifying
symbols for life and eternity. They do not fail—there is no suggestion that today (only)
to Wordsworth the beggars represent poverty and tomorrow to someone else they could
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represent something else. The meaning Wordsworth finds as he follows his associated
ideas to a transcendent level is a permanent one. Through his metaphors, he, the poet, is
the one who identifies meaning, sees the importance and ultimately names the other
things according to their meaning.
The natural and physical things, to Wordsworth, are important not in and of
themselves but because they represent deeper ideas. His associated ideas take him, as he
sees it, closer to the “thing” that can be known. Locke would call it a mode.
Wordsworth would call it meaning, the part, the idea that is important. The physical
thing is only a partial manifestation of it, a suggestion to be taken by the poet, and, via
associated ideas, he can arrive at the real “thing,” the meaning. In “Animal Tranquillity
and Decay,” the poet says of the old man:
He travels on, and in his face, his step,
His gait, is one expression: every limb,
His look and bending figure all bespeak
A man who does not move with pain, but moves
With thought. (3-7)
The physical posture and the old body of the man are only hints at who (and what) he
really is (and really represents). The “thought” is the crucial issue, not the physical
expressions. The poet observes the man’s physical body, but then the poet can infer that
the man is “by nature led/ To peace so perfect that the young behold/ With envy, what the
Old Man hardly feels” (12-14). The poet—one of the “young” who behold this truth
about the man—inherently knows more about the man than even the man himself can
understand by relying on his own physical body, which hardly “feels” at all.

88

Frost, on the contrary, finds the physical thing itself important. He would
appreciate the pleasure in Wordsworth’s associating ideas. Frost does it himself many
times. Frost even acknowledges in “Something Like a Star” that at times we can “choose
something like a star/ To stay our minds on and be staid” (24-25). In saying this, Frost is
admitting that things above that we cannot touch and cannot really understand—as he
notes in the poem, he cannot know the “degree of heat [of the star or the]…elements [it]
blend[s]” (12, 15)—still can provide a stay for us, a clarification wrested from chaos.
However, the stay can be only temporary. Though one can “be staid” beyond earth, it is
in the “staying” there—following associated ideas into the transcendent and unknown
and then remaining there—that presents problems for Frost. Though Wordsworth can be
comfortable in this kind of transcendent, eternal negative capability, Frost cannot. (In
“Animal Tranquility,” for example, all is indistinct—the “thought” is vague, the “peace
so perfect” is not even felt—but the suggestion is that this is a picture of melting into
eternity.) For Frost, there is no permanent stay; the truth is, for him, that everything
always changes, and that is all he can know.
This concept of limited knowledge that Frost embraces does, however, illustrate
that he, too, is content with a kind of negative capability but one that is very different
from the kind Wordsworth embraces. Frost’s negative capability seems to be a step more
negative than Wordsworth’s and one with which the romantic poet could never be
content. Wordsworth cannot always name the meaning he discovers in natural/physical
things, and with this not-knowing, he is content. Frost, too, knows that in this
earthly/physical reality he will not and cannot know everything. Yet, Frost is content not
just with being unable to name meaning in things but also with the fact that there is no
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guarantee that there is any deeper meaning in things. Wordsworth never could be content
with this kind of knowledge or lack thereof. The spontaneous wisdom of Wordsworth’s
nature insures him that there are meanings yet to be found; Frost’s nature provides no
such reassurance.
So, though Wordsworth finds meaning through both association of ideas and
transcending the physical, Frost does not. For the modern poet, association is fine—it’s
fun and can give, perhaps, individual but never universal meaning. However,
transcendence, for Frost, really gets one nowhere. In fact, in “The Star-Splitter” Brad
McLaughlin is laughable because he “burned his house down for the fire insurance/ And
spent the proceeds on a telescope” (16-17), and, after looking through the telescope at the
things above, the poet asks, “Do we know any better where we are,/ And how it stands
between the night…And a man…?” (96-97). The implied answer is no. Looking above,
transcending the physical earth reaches nothing of substance, whereas that is just the
point—and the importance—of the poetic act for Wordsworth.
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